An Empirical Model of Endogenous Attention

42 Pages Posted: 17 Sep 2025 Last revised: 12 Apr 2026

See all articles by Tianyu Han

Tianyu Han

Hong Kong University of Science & Technology (HKUST)

T. Tony Ke

The Chinese University of Hong Kong (CUHK)

J. Miguel Villas-Boas

University of California, Berkeley

Date Written: April 12, 2026

Abstract

Before making a choice, individuals can gradually gather information on multiple different possible alternatives. Analysts may observe how long individuals spend gathering information on each alternative, when they switch from one alternative to another, and when they ultimately make their final choice. We develop an empirical model on this choice process, endogenizing the choice of which alternative the individual obtains information from at each point in time, and estimate the model with data from eye-tracking experiments. The empirical analysis yields estimates of the relative size of search costs, attention switching costs, and informativeness of search for information. Counterfactual analysis shows that higher attention switching costs reduce search duration and induce fewer attention switches; in comparison, higher search costs also reduce search duration but induce more attention switches. The model also predicts a positive correlation between attention to an alternative and the likelihood of choosing it, as individuals are more likely to seek additional information about options that they believe to be better.

Keywords: Search, Attention, Learning, Deep Reinforcement Learning

Suggested Citation

Han, Tianyu and Ke, Tony and Villas-Boas, J. Miguel, An Empirical Model of Endogenous Attention (April 12, 2026). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5455794 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.5455794

Tianyu Han (Contact Author)

Hong Kong University of Science & Technology (HKUST) ( email )

HOME PAGE: http://tianyu-han.com

Tony Ke

The Chinese University of Hong Kong (CUHK) ( email )

Shatin, N.T.
Hong Kong
Hong Kong

J. Miguel Villas-Boas

University of California, Berkeley ( email )

Haas School of Business
Berkeley, CA 94720
United States
510-642-1250 (Phone)
510-643-1420 (Fax)

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
119
Abstract Views
315
Rank
664,543
PlumX Metrics