Artificially Biased Intelligence: Does AI Think Like a Human Investor?

68 Pages Posted: 5 Jan 2026 Last revised: 14 Jan 2026

See all articles by Javad Keshavarz

Javad Keshavarz

Auburn University

Cayman Seagraves

University of Tulsa - Collins College of Business

Stace Sirmans

Auburn University - Department of Finance

Date Written: January 01, 2026

Abstract

We test whether large language models exhibit cognitive biases in financial decisionmaking using a prompt-pair experimental design across 48 models and eleven biases. LLMs display economically significant biases in how they process information (framing, anchoring) and respond to social and narrative cues (herding, authority, representativeness, availability). Model intelligence relates non-monotonically to bias: higher capability reduces susceptibility to framing and representativeness but increases sunk cost, loss aversion, and disposition-style asymmetries. Less capable models behave like momentum investors, overweighting recent returns and social signals; more capable models resemble disciplined value investors, emphasizing fundamentals. Context engineering and prompt preprocessing mitigate some biases but prove ineffective or counterproductive for others, implying that debiasing requires bias-specific validation rather than generic guardrails. These findings have direct implications for AI governance in investment workflows.

Keywords: Large Language Models, Cognitive Bias, Behavioral Finance, Framing Effect, Anchoring Bias, Loss Aversion, Disposition Effect, Artificial Intelligence, AI, LLM, Large Language Models, ChatGPT

Suggested Citation

Keshavarz, Javad and Seagraves, Cayman and Sirmans, Stace, Artificially Biased Intelligence: Does AI Think Like a Human Investor? (January 01, 2026). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5998954 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.5998954

Javad Keshavarz

Auburn University ( email )

415 West Magnolia Avenue
Auburn, AL 36849
United States

Cayman Seagraves

University of Tulsa - Collins College of Business ( email )

600 South College
Tulsa, OK 74104
United States
918-631-2541 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.caymanseagraves.com

Stace Sirmans (Contact Author)

Auburn University - Department of Finance ( email )

Auburn, AL 36849
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.stacesirmans.com

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