The Rules of Standard Setting Organizations: An Empirical Analysis

Chiao, Benjamin; Tirole, Jean; Lerner, Josh

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The Rules of Standard Setting Organizations: An Empirical Analysis

NBER Working Paper No. w11156

34 Pages Posted: 22 Mar 2005 Last revised: 26 Dec 2022

See all articles by Benjamin Chiao

Benjamin Chiao

PSB Paris School of Business; Southwestern University of Finance and Economics

University of Toulouse 1 - Industrial Economic Institute (IDEI); University of Toulouse 1 - Groupe de Recherche en Economie Mathématique et Quantitative (GREMAQ); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Josh Lerner

Harvard Business School - Finance Unit; Harvard University - Entrepreneurial Management Unit; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); Harvard University - Private Capital Research Institute

There are 4 versions of this paper

Date Written: February 2005

Abstract

This paper empirically explores the procedures employed by standard-setting organizations. Consistent with Lerner-Tirole (2004), we find (a) a negative relationship between the extent to which an SSO is oriented to technology sponsors and the concession level required of sponsors and (b) a positive correlation between the sponsor-friendliness of the selected SSO and the quality of the standard. We also develop and test two extensions of the earlier model: the presence of provisions mandating royalty-free licensing is negatively associated with disclosure requirements, and when there are only a limited number of SSOs, the relationship between concessions and user friendliness is weaker.

Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation

Chiao, Benjamin and Tirole, Jean and Lerner, Josh, The Rules of Standard Setting Organizations: An Empirical Analysis (February 2005). NBER Working Paper No. w11156, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=673243