How Executive Compensation Changes In Response to Personal Income Tax Shocks (Who Pays the CEO’s Income Taxes?)

78 Pages Posted: 19 Mar 2020 Last revised: 22 Apr 2026

See all articles by Benjamin Bennett

Benjamin Bennett

Texas Christian University - M.J. Neeley School of Business

Jeffrey L. Coles

University of Utah - Department of Finance; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Zexi Wang

Lancaster University - Department of Accounting and Finance

Date Written: July 29, 2020

Abstract

US CEOs receive an abnormal increase in pay of 6.4% to 7.4% following large state personal income tax increases.  The pay increase substantially compensates the CEO for the increased tax liability.  The increase in pay is larger when: the CEO has more employment options, is less tied to the company, or corporate governance is doubtful.  Reflecting CEO outside options, the CEO’s supply curve for managerial input is far more elastic than the firm’s demand curve.  Indicating agency concerns, CEOs do not experience an abnormal pay cut following a tax decrease. 

Keywords: Executive compensation, Personal income tax

JEL Classification: H24, H71, J33, M12

Suggested Citation

Bennett, Benjamin and Coles, Jeffrey L. and Wang, Zexi, How Executive Compensation Changes In Response to Personal Income Tax Shocks (Who Pays the CEO’s Income Taxes?) (July 29, 2020). European Corporate Governance Institute – Finance Working Paper No. 1108/2025, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3540304 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3540304

Benjamin Bennett (Contact Author)

Texas Christian University - M.J. Neeley School of Business ( email )

Fort Worth, TX 76129
United States

Jeffrey L. Coles

University of Utah - Department of Finance ( email )

David Eccles School of Business
Salt Lake City, UT 84112
United States
801-587-9093 (Phone)

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

Zexi Wang

Lancaster University - Department of Accounting and Finance ( email )

Lancaster, Lancashire LA1 4YX
United Kingdom

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