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Northwestern University - Department of Economics
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Repeated games, bounded recall strategies, folk theorem, imperfect monitoring
Testing Strategic Experts
persuasion, hard evidence, debate
Testing, Strategic, Experts
repeated games, bounded recall strategies, folk theorem, imperfect monitoring
Equilibrium existence, games with ties, auctions
comparative statics, comparative dynamics, adaptive learning, monotone iterations, games with strategic complementarities
monotone iterations on correspondences, Tarski’s fixed-point theorem, Veinott-Zhou version of Tarski’s theorem for correspondences, Tarski-Kantorovich principle for correspondences, adaptive learning
search, commitment, price discrimination
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Private monitoring, Relational Contracts, repeated games
