Markus Walzl

RWTH Aachen University - Chair for Economics (Microeconomics)

Aachen, 52056

Germany

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

9

DOWNLOADS

1,295

SSRN CITATIONS

14

CROSSREF CITATIONS

12

Scholarly Papers (9)

1.

Corporate Leniency Programs in the EU and the USA

Number of pages: 21 Posted: 29 Apr 2003
Markus Walzl and Eberhard Feess
RWTH Aachen University - Chair for Economics (Microeconomics) and Frankfurt School of Finance & Management gemeinnützige GmbH
Downloads 412 (70,957)
Citation 1

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self-reporting, optimal law enforcement, criminal teams, leniency programs

2.

Corruption and Self-Reporting in Optimal Law Enforcement

Aachen Micro Working Paper No. 5
Number of pages: 19 Posted: 30 Nov 2001
Markus Walzl and Eberhard Feess
RWTH Aachen University - Chair for Economics (Microeconomics) and Frankfurt School of Finance & Management gemeinnützige GmbH
Downloads 168 (179,281)

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self-reporting, optimal law enforcement, corruption

Self-Reporting in Optimal Law Enforcement When There are Criminal Teams

Aachen Micro Working Paper 02/02
Number of pages: 24 Posted: 09 Apr 2002
Markus Walzl and Eberhard Feess
RWTH Aachen University - Chair for Economics (Microeconomics) and Frankfurt School of Finance & Management gemeinnützige GmbH
Downloads 136 (214,252)

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self-reporting, optimal law enforcement, crime, criminal teams, corruption, leniency programs

Self-Reporting in Optimal Law Enforcement When There are Criminal Teams

Economica, Vol. 71, No. 283, pp. 333-348, August 2004
Number of pages: 16 Posted: 11 Jul 2004
Eberhard Feess and Markus Walzl
Frankfurt School of Finance & Management gemeinnützige GmbH and RWTH Aachen University - Chair for Economics (Microeconomics)
Downloads 30 (484,099)
Citation 1
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4.

Should Principals Reveal Their Private Information?

Aachen Micro Working Paper No. 4/01
Number of pages: 19 Posted: 30 Nov 2001
Markus Walzl, Eberhard Feess and Michael Schieble
RWTH Aachen University - Chair for Economics (Microeconomics), Frankfurt School of Finance & Management gemeinnützige GmbH and Bain & Company - Munich Office
Downloads 133 (217,463)

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information revelation, hidden action, limited liability, informed principal

5.

When Bidding More is Not Enough: All-Pay Auctions with Handicaps

Bonn Econ. Discussion Paper No. 14/2002
Number of pages: 23 Posted: 21 Aug 2002
Markus Walzl, Eberhard Feess and Gerd Muehlheusser
RWTH Aachen University - Chair for Economics (Microeconomics), Frankfurt School of Finance & Management gemeinnützige GmbH and University of Hamburg
Downloads 110 (250,465)

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All-pay auction, contest, asymmetric allocation rule, rent-seeking, asymmetric information

6.

On the Optimal Design of Unfair Contests

Number of pages: 27 Posted: 30 Oct 2002
Markus Walzl, Eberhard Feess and Gerd Muehlheusser
RWTH Aachen University - Chair for Economics (Microeconomics), Frankfurt School of Finance & Management gemeinnützige GmbH and University of Hamburg
Downloads 101 (265,695)
Citation 8

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Asymmetric contests, asymmetric information, contest design

7.

Optimal Self-Reporting Schemes with Multiple Stages and Option Values

Number of pages: 21 Posted: 03 Sep 2002
Markus Walzl and Eberhard Feess
RWTH Aachen University - Chair for Economics (Microeconomics) and Frankfurt School of Finance & Management gemeinnützige GmbH
Downloads 76 (317,334)
Citation 2

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self-reporting, tax amnesties, optimal law enforcement, ex post asymmetric information

8.

Delegated Expertise - When are Good Projects Bad News?

Number of pages: 8 Posted: 20 Jan 2003
Markus Walzl and Eberhard Feess
RWTH Aachen University - Chair for Economics (Microeconomics) and Frankfurt School of Finance & Management gemeinnützige GmbH
Downloads 72 (327,191)
Citation 3

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delegated expertise, information revelation, hidden action, limited liability

9.

The Impact of Heterogeneity on the Optimal Self-Reporting Scheme

Number of pages: 12 Posted: 07 Oct 2002
Markus Walzl and Eberhard Feess
RWTH Aachen University - Chair for Economics (Microeconomics) and Frankfurt School of Finance & Management gemeinnützige GmbH
Downloads 57 (369,100)

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self-reporting, tax amnesties, optimal law enforcement, ex post asymmetric information