RWTH Aachen University - Chair for Economics (Microeconomics)
self-reporting, optimal law enforcement, criminal teams, leniency programs
self-reporting, optimal law enforcement, corruption
self-reporting, optimal law enforcement, crime, criminal teams, corruption, leniency programs
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information revelation, hidden action, limited liability, informed principal
All-pay auction, contest, asymmetric allocation rule, rent-seeking, asymmetric information
Asymmetric contests, asymmetric information, contest design
self-reporting, tax amnesties, optimal law enforcement, ex post asymmetric information
delegated expertise, information revelation, hidden action, limited liability
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