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Markus Walzl

RWTH Aachen University - Chair for Economics (Microeconomics)

Aachen, 52056

Germany

  • RWTH Aachen University - Chair for Economics (Microeconomics)

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SCHOLARLY PAPERS

9

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19

Scholarly Papers (9)

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1.

Corporate Leniency Programs in the EU and the USA

Number of pages: 21 Posted: 29 Apr 2003
Markus Walzl and Eberhard Feess
RWTH Aachen University - Chair for Economics (Microeconomics) and Frankfurt School of Finance & Management
Downloads 493 (143,016)
Citation 1

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self-reporting, optimal law enforcement, criminal teams, leniency programs

2.

Corruption and Self-Reporting in Optimal Law Enforcement

Aachen Micro Working Paper No. 5
Number of pages: 19 Posted: 30 Nov 2001
Markus Walzl and Eberhard Feess
RWTH Aachen University - Chair for Economics (Microeconomics) and Frankfurt School of Finance & Management
Downloads 205 (373,348)

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self-reporting, optimal law enforcement, corruption

3.

Self-Reporting in Optimal Law Enforcement When There are Criminal Teams

Aachen Micro Working Paper 02/02
Number of pages: 24 Posted: 09 Apr 2002
Markus Walzl and Eberhard Feess
RWTH Aachen University - Chair for Economics (Microeconomics) and Frankfurt School of Finance & Management
Downloads 186 (409,459)
Citation 1

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self-reporting, optimal law enforcement, crime, criminal teams, corruption, leniency programs

4.

Should Principals Reveal Their Private Information?

Aachen Micro Working Paper No. 4/01
Number of pages: 19 Posted: 30 Nov 2001
Markus Walzl, Eberhard Feess and Michael Schieble
RWTH Aachen University - Chair for Economics (Microeconomics), Frankfurt School of Finance & Management and Bain & Company - Munich Office
Downloads 177 (426,635)

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information revelation, hidden action, limited liability, informed principal

5.

When Bidding More is Not Enough: All-Pay Auctions with Handicaps

Bonn Econ. Discussion Paper No. 14/2002
Number of pages: 23 Posted: 21 Aug 2002
Markus Walzl, Eberhard Feess and Gerd Muehlheusser
RWTH Aachen University - Chair for Economics (Microeconomics), Frankfurt School of Finance & Management and University of Hamburg
Downloads 145 (508,926)

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All-pay auction, contest, asymmetric allocation rule, rent-seeking, asymmetric information

6.

On the Optimal Design of Unfair Contests

Number of pages: 27 Posted: 30 Oct 2002
Markus Walzl, Eberhard Feess and Gerd Muehlheusser
RWTH Aachen University - Chair for Economics (Microeconomics), Frankfurt School of Finance & Management and University of Hamburg
Downloads 138 (530,816)
Citation 8

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Asymmetric contests, asymmetric information, contest design

7.

Optimal Self-Reporting Schemes with Multiple Stages and Option Values

Number of pages: 21 Posted: 03 Sep 2002
Markus Walzl and Eberhard Feess
RWTH Aachen University - Chair for Economics (Microeconomics) and Frankfurt School of Finance & Management
Downloads 111 (640,165)
Citation 3

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self-reporting, tax amnesties, optimal law enforcement, ex post asymmetric information

8.

Delegated Expertise - When are Good Projects Bad News?

Number of pages: 8 Posted: 20 Jan 2003
Markus Walzl and Eberhard Feess
RWTH Aachen University - Chair for Economics (Microeconomics) and Frankfurt School of Finance & Management
Downloads 100 (689,572)
Citation 6

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delegated expertise, information revelation, hidden action, limited liability

9.

The Impact of Heterogeneity on the Optimal Self-Reporting Scheme

Number of pages: 12 Posted: 07 Oct 2002
Markus Walzl and Eberhard Feess
RWTH Aachen University - Chair for Economics (Microeconomics) and Frankfurt School of Finance & Management
Downloads 90 (742,061)

Abstract:

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self-reporting, tax amnesties, optimal law enforcement, ex post asymmetric information