Eberhard Feess

Frankfurt School of Finance & Management gemeinnützige GmbH

Sonnemannstraße 9-11

Frankfurt am Main, 60314

Germany

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

42

DOWNLOADS

5,117

CITATIONS

157

Scholarly Papers (42)

1.

The German Capital Markets Model Case Act (KapMuG) - A European Role Model For Increasing the Efficiency of Capital Markets? Analysis and Suggestions for Reform

Number of pages: 35 Posted: 01 Oct 2010 Last Revised: 21 Mar 2012
Axel Halfmeier and Eberhard Feess
Leuphana Universität Lüneburg and Frankfurt School of Finance & Management gemeinnützige GmbH
Downloads 529 (50,897)
Citation 2

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Shareholder mass litigation, securities litigation, KapMuG, standard of proof

2.

Transfer Fee Regulations in European Football

IZA Discussion Paper No. 423
Number of pages: 28 Posted: 08 Feb 2002
Gerd Muehlheusser and Eberhard Feess
University of Hamburg and Frankfurt School of Finance & Management gemeinnützige GmbH
Downloads 431 (65,672)
Citation 20

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Labor Contracts, Bosman Judgement, Transfer Fees, Breach of Contract, Investment Incentives, General Skills, Externalities

3.

Corporate Leniency Programs in the EU and the USA

Number of pages: 21 Posted: 29 Apr 2003
Markus Walzl and Eberhard Feess
RWTH Aachen University - Chair for Economics (Microeconomics) and Frankfurt School of Finance & Management gemeinnützige GmbH
Downloads 412 (69,358)

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self-reporting, optimal law enforcement, criminal teams, leniency programs

4.

The Basel Accord and the Value of Bank Differentiation

CFS Working Paper No. 2004/25, AFA 2008 New Orleans Meetings Paper
Number of pages: 68 Posted: 31 Dec 2004 Last Revised: 02 Jun 2013
Eberhard Feess and Ulrich Hege
Frankfurt School of Finance & Management gemeinnützige GmbH and Toulouse School of Economics
Downloads 376 (77,183)
Citation 8

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bank capital regulation, bank failure, risk-taking, Basel Accord, internal ratings.

5.

Competition, Bonuses, and Risk-Taking in the Banking Industry

Number of pages: 48 Posted: 09 Oct 2010 Last Revised: 30 Sep 2011
Justus-Liebig-University Giessen, Frankfurt School of Finance & Management gemeinnützige GmbH and Berlin School of Economics and Law
Downloads 314 (94,738)
Citation 19

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Bonuses, excessive risk, screening, competition

6.

Legal Restrictions on Buyout Fees: Theory and Evidence from German Soccer

IZA Discussion Paper No. 1180
Number of pages: 47 Posted: 07 Jul 2004
Eberhard Feess, Bernd Frick and Gerd Muehlheusser
Frankfurt School of Finance & Management gemeinnützige GmbH, University of Witten/Herdecke - Institute of Economics and Business Administration and University of Hamburg
Downloads 308 (96,759)

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Labor contracts, Bosman judgement, empirical contract theory

7.

Patent Licensing and Price Discrimination

Number of pages: 13 Posted: 10 Jan 2006
Sandro Gleave and Eberhard Feess
Federal Cartel Office and Frankfurt School of Finance & Management gemeinnützige GmbH
Downloads 197 (152,076)

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Patent licensing, Price discrimination, Endogenous valuation

8.

Environmental Liability Under Uncertain Causation

Number of pages: 29 Posted: 06 Sep 2007
Frankfurt School of Finance & Management gemeinnützige GmbH, University of Hamburg and Portsmouth Business School
Downloads 192 (155,779)
Citation 2

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environmental liability, uncertainty over causation, standard of proof, threshold probabilities

9.

Academic Copyright in the Publishing Game: A Contest Perspective

Number of pages: 31 Posted: 29 Mar 2011 Last Revised: 25 May 2014
Eberhard Feess and Marc Scheufen
Frankfurt School of Finance & Management gemeinnützige GmbH and Ruhr University Bochum
Downloads 170 (173,695)
Citation 3

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Open Access, Copyright, Economics of Science, Publishing Game, Tullock Contest

Contracts as Rent Seeking Devices: Evidence from German Soccer

IZA Discussion Paper No. 3834
Number of pages: 35 Posted: 25 Nov 2008
Eberhard Feess, Michael Gerfin and Gerd Muehlheusser
Frankfurt School of Finance & Management gemeinnützige GmbH, University of Bern and University of Hamburg
Downloads 170 (173,828)

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strategic contracting, rent seeking, empirical contract theory, long-term contracts, breach of contract, sports economics

Contracts as Rent‐Seeking Devices: Evidence from German Soccer

Economic Inquiry, Vol. 53, Issue 1, pp. 714-730, 2015
Number of pages: 17 Posted: 21 Nov 2014
Eberhard Feess, Michael Gerfin and Gerd Muehlheusser
Frankfurt School of Finance & Management gemeinnützige GmbH, University of Bern and University of Hamburg
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Citation 1
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11.

Corruption and Self-Reporting in Optimal Law Enforcement

Aachen Micro Working Paper No. 5
Number of pages: 19 Posted: 30 Nov 2001
Markus Walzl and Eberhard Feess
RWTH Aachen University - Chair for Economics (Microeconomics) and Frankfurt School of Finance & Management gemeinnützige GmbH
Downloads 168 (175,502)

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self-reporting, optimal law enforcement, corruption

Self-Reporting in Optimal Law Enforcement When There are Criminal Teams

Aachen Micro Working Paper 02/02
Number of pages: 24 Posted: 09 Apr 2002
Markus Walzl and Eberhard Feess
RWTH Aachen University - Chair for Economics (Microeconomics) and Frankfurt School of Finance & Management gemeinnützige GmbH
Downloads 135 (210,914)

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self-reporting, optimal law enforcement, crime, criminal teams, corruption, leniency programs

Self-Reporting in Optimal Law Enforcement When There are Criminal Teams

Economica, Vol. 71, No. 283, pp. 333-348, August 2004
Number of pages: 16 Posted: 11 Jul 2004
Eberhard Feess and Markus Walzl
Frankfurt School of Finance & Management gemeinnützige GmbH and RWTH Aachen University - Chair for Economics (Microeconomics)
Downloads 30 (473,652)
Citation 6
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13.

Should Principals Reveal Their Private Information?

Aachen Micro Working Paper No. 4/01
Number of pages: 19 Posted: 30 Nov 2001
Markus Walzl, Eberhard Feess and Michael Schieble
RWTH Aachen University - Chair for Economics (Microeconomics), Frankfurt School of Finance & Management gemeinnützige GmbH and Bain & Company - Munich Office
Downloads 132 (214,181)

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information revelation, hidden action, limited liability, informed principal

14.

Reporter's Privilege and Incentives to Leak

Number of pages: 21 Posted: 14 Mar 2007 Last Revised: 07 Oct 2008
Ido Baum, Eberhard Feess and Ansgar Wohlschlegel
Haim Striks School of Law - College of Management, Frankfurt School of Finance & Management gemeinnützige GmbH and Portsmouth Business School
Downloads 123 (226,020)
Citation 1

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Whistle-blowing, reporter's privilege, burden of proof, errors in court

15.

All-Unit Discounts and the Problem of Surplus Division

Number of pages: 19 Posted: 16 Dec 2007 Last Revised: 20 Feb 2010
Eberhard Feess and Ansgar Wohlschlegel
Frankfurt School of Finance & Management gemeinnützige GmbH and Portsmouth Business School
Downloads 108 (248,437)
Citation 8

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Discounts, Abuse of Market Dominance, Foreclosure, Rent Shifting, Exclusive Dealing.

16.

When Bidding More is Not Enough: All-Pay Auctions with Handicaps

Bonn Econ. Discussion Paper No. 14/2002
Number of pages: 23 Posted: 21 Aug 2002
Markus Walzl, Eberhard Feess and Gerd Muehlheusser
RWTH Aachen University - Chair for Economics (Microeconomics), Frankfurt School of Finance & Management gemeinnützige GmbH and University of Hamburg
Downloads 106 (251,635)

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All-pay auction, contest, asymmetric allocation rule, rent-seeking, asymmetric information

17.

On the Optimal Design of Unfair Contests

Number of pages: 27 Posted: 30 Oct 2002
Markus Walzl, Eberhard Feess and Gerd Muehlheusser
RWTH Aachen University - Chair for Economics (Microeconomics), Frankfurt School of Finance & Management gemeinnützige GmbH and University of Hamburg
Downloads 99 (263,674)
Citation 5

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Asymmetric contests, asymmetric information, contest design

18.
Downloads 92 (276,471)
Citation 5

International Technology Transfers and Competition

Number of pages: 23 Posted: 26 Nov 2006
Eberhard Feess, Michael Hoeck and Oliver Lorz
Frankfurt School of Finance & Management gemeinnützige GmbH, Proyecta Ventures GmbH and RWTH Aachen University
Downloads 89 (284,622)
Citation 1

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technology licensing, international technology transfers, oligopoly

International Technology Transfers and Competition

Review of International Economics, Vol. 17, Issue 5, pp. 1038-1052, November 2009
Number of pages: 15 Posted: 02 Nov 2009
Eberhard Feess, Michael Hoeck and Oliver Lorz
Frankfurt School of Finance & Management gemeinnützige GmbH, Proyecta Ventures GmbH and RWTH Aachen University
Downloads 3 (649,932)
Citation 5
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19.

Screening in Courts: On the Joint Use of Negligence and Causation Standards

Number of pages: 25 Posted: 13 Dec 2007 Last Revised: 02 Sep 2008
Frankfurt School of Finance & Management gemeinnützige GmbH, University of Hamburg and Portsmouth Business School
Downloads 91 (278,408)
Citation 1

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liability rules, uncertainty over causation, negligence, threshold probabilities, screening

20.

Mandatory Deferral of Banker Compensation and Misallocation of Risky Projects

Number of pages: 31 Posted: 29 Jul 2012 Last Revised: 30 Jul 2012
Eberhard Feess and Ansgar Wohlschlegel
Frankfurt School of Finance & Management gemeinnützige GmbH and Portsmouth Business School
Downloads 90 (280,313)
Citation 4

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Deferred Bonuses, risk-shifting, financial crisis, Executive compensation

21.

Optimal Self-Reporting Schemes with Multiple Stages and Option Values

Number of pages: 21 Posted: 03 Sep 2002
Markus Walzl and Eberhard Feess
RWTH Aachen University - Chair for Economics (Microeconomics) and Frankfurt School of Finance & Management gemeinnützige GmbH
Downloads 76 (310,647)
Citation 1

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self-reporting, tax amnesties, optimal law enforcement, ex post asymmetric information

22.

Why are Corrupt Countries Less Successful in Consolidating Their Budgets?

Number of pages: 32 Posted: 08 Sep 2009
Zayed University, European Central Bank (ECB), Frankfurt School of Finance & Management gemeinnützige GmbH and Portsmouth Business School
Downloads 75 (313,020)
Citation 8

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Corruption, Fiscal consolidation, Binary choice models, Panel data

23.

The Impact of Fine Size and Uncertainty on Punishment and Deterrence: Evidence from the Laboratory

Number of pages: 40 Posted: 11 Jul 2014
Eberhard Feess, Markus Schramm and Ansgar Wohlschlegel
Frankfurt School of Finance & Management gemeinnützige GmbH, RWTH Aachen University and Portsmouth Business School
Downloads 71 (322,760)
Citation 4

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Deterrence, fine size, type-I and type-II error, experiment

24.

Delegated Expertise - When are Good Projects Bad News?

Number of pages: 8 Posted: 20 Jan 2003
Markus Walzl and Eberhard Feess
RWTH Aachen University - Chair for Economics (Microeconomics) and Frankfurt School of Finance & Management gemeinnützige GmbH
Downloads 71 (322,760)
Citation 3

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delegated expertise, information revelation, hidden action, limited liability

25.

The Impact of Truth-Telling and Limited Wealth in a Principal-Agent Model

Schmalenbach Business Review, Vol. 57, 2005
Number of pages: 18 Posted: 09 Mar 2005
Eberhard Feess, Sonja Ossig and Markus Walzl
Frankfurt School of Finance & Management gemeinnützige GmbH, RWTH Aachen University - Faculty of Economics and University of Maastricht - Department of Economics
Downloads 69 (327,799)

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Delegated expertise, limited liability, moral hazard, principal-agent theory

26.

Why Higher Price Sensitivity of Consumers May Increase Average Prices: An Analysis of the European Electricity Market

FCN Working Paper No. 16/2010
Number of pages: 27 Posted: 19 Dec 2010
Tobias Paulun, Eberhard Feess and Reinhard Madlener
RWTH Aachen University - Institute of Power Systems and Power Economics, Frankfurt School of Finance & Management gemeinnützige GmbH and RWTH Aachen University
Downloads 63 (343,861)
Citation 85

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Electricity Market, Price Sensitivity, Heterogenous Oligopoly, Price Competition, Capacity Constraints

27.

The Impact of Heterogeneity on the Optimal Self-Reporting Scheme

Number of pages: 12 Posted: 07 Oct 2002
Markus Walzl and Eberhard Feess
RWTH Aachen University - Chair for Economics (Microeconomics) and Frankfurt School of Finance & Management gemeinnützige GmbH
Downloads 57 (361,269)

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self-reporting, tax amnesties, optimal law enforcement, ex post asymmetric information

28.

Judicial Effort and the Appeal System: Theory and Experiment

Number of pages: 64 Posted: 27 Sep 2017
Eberhard Feess and Roee Sarel
Frankfurt School of Finance & Management gemeinnützige GmbH and Institute of Law and Economics, University of Hamburg
Downloads 56 (364,323)
Citation 4

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Judges, Appeals, Effort, Experimental Law and Economics

29.

The Impact of Fine Size and Uncertainty on Punishment and Deterrence: Theory and Evidence from the Laboratory

IZA Discussion Paper No. 9388
Number of pages: 31 Posted: 12 Oct 2015
Frankfurt School of Finance & Management gemeinnützige GmbH, Heinrich-Heine-Universität Düsseldorf, RWTH Aachen University and Portsmouth Business School
Downloads 52 (380,211)
Citation 1

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deterrence, punishment, legal uncertainty, fines, laboratory experiment, partial and equilibrium effects

30.

Bank Capital Requirements and Mandatory Deferral of Compensation

Number of pages: 30 Posted: 24 Jul 2014
Eberhard Feess and Ansgar Wohlschlegel
Frankfurt School of Finance & Management gemeinnützige GmbH and Portsmouth Business School
Downloads 48 (390,377)

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Bank capital requirements, deferred bonuses, risk-shifting, financial crisis, executive compensation.

31.

Incentive Schemes, Private Information and the Double-Edged Role of Competition for Agents

Number of pages: 56 Posted: 03 Jan 2013 Last Revised: 12 Jul 2016
Justus-Liebig-University Giessen, Frankfurt School of Finance & Management gemeinnützige GmbH, Berlin School of Economics and Law and University of Innsbruck
Downloads 47 (393,747)
Citation 4

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Incentive compensation, screening, imperfect labor market competition, vertical differentiation, horizontal differentiation, risk aversion

32.

Under-Delegation in Case of Pure Moral Hazard: Evidence from the Laboratory

Number of pages: 37 Posted: 11 Jul 2014
Eberhard Feess, Oliver Lorz and Markus Schramm
Frankfurt School of Finance & Management gemeinnützige GmbH, RWTH Aachen University and RWTH Aachen University
Downloads 45 (400,717)
Citation 2

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Moral hazard, gender, control premium, delegation, principal-agent, experiment, real-effort

33.

Stable Preferences or Moral Accounting?

Number of pages: 23 Posted: 13 Aug 2018
Eberhard Feess and Roee Sarel
Frankfurt School of Finance & Management gemeinnützige GmbH and Institute of Law and Economics, University of Hamburg
Downloads 39 (423,037)

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mental accounting, moral accounting, moral self-licensing, stable preferences

34.

The Impact of the Endowment Effect on the Law and Economics of Product Return Regulations

Number of pages: 44 Posted: 19 Dec 2018 Last Revised: 22 Mar 2019
Shmuel I. Becher, Eberhard Feess and Roee Sarel
Victoria University of Wellington, Frankfurt School of Finance & Management gemeinnützige GmbH and Institute of Law and Economics, University of Hamburg
Downloads 35 (439,425)

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product returns, return policy, consumer protection, consumer uncertainty, cancellations, withdrawals

35.

Monitoring Reduces Efficiency: Evidence from the Laboratory

Number of pages: 34 Posted: 11 Jul 2014
Eberhard Feess and Markus Schramm
Frankfurt School of Finance & Management gemeinnützige GmbH and RWTH Aachen University
Downloads 30 (461,585)

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Monitoring, delegation, control premium, laboratory experiment

36.

Optimal Law Enforcement with Sophisticated and Naive Offenders

CESifo Working Paper Series No. 7106
Number of pages: 34 Posted: 09 Aug 2018
Berno Buechel, Eberhard Feess and Gerd Muehlheusser
University of Fribourg - Faculty of Economics and Social Science, Frankfurt School of Finance & Management gemeinnützige GmbH and University of Hamburg
Downloads 6 (599,746)

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optimal law enforcement, deterrence, behavioral law & economics, naïveté, shrouding

37.

Moral Hazard, Risk Sharing, and the Optimal Pool Size

Journal of Risk and Insurance, Vol. 86, Issue 2, pp. 297-313, 2019
Number of pages: 17 Posted: 11 May 2019
University of Bern, Frankfurt School of Finance & Management gemeinnützige GmbH, Universidad Complutense de Madrid (UCM), Frankfurt School of Finance & Management gemeinnützige GmbH and University of Hohenheim
Downloads 2 (631,025)
Citation 1
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38.

You are One of Us Now! How Do Share Prices of Rivals React to Privatization?

The Journal of Industrial Economics, Vol. 57, Issue 2, pp. 265-293, June 2009
Number of pages: 29 Posted: 20 May 2009
Claremont Colleges - Peter F. Drucker Graduate School of Management, Zayed University, Frankfurt School of Finance & Management gemeinnützige GmbH and Massey University - Department of Commerce
Downloads 1 (643,712)
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39.

Revenue Sharing in Professional Sports Leagues

Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 56, Issue 2, pp. 255-265, May 2009
Number of pages: 11 Posted: 27 Apr 2009
Eberhard Feess and Frank Stähler
Frankfurt School of Finance & Management gemeinnützige GmbH and University of Tuebingen - Department of Economics
Downloads 1 (643,712)
Citation 2
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40.

The Impact of Religion and the Degree of Religiosity on Work Ethic: A Multilevel Analysis

Number of pages: 29 Posted: 11 Oct 2014
Eberhard Feess, Helge Mueller and Sabrina G. Ruhnau
Frankfurt School of Finance & Management gemeinnützige GmbH, Frankfurt School of Finance & Management gemeinnützige GmbH and Frankfurt School of Finance & Management gemeinnützige GmbH
Downloads 0 (661,885)
Citation 2
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41.

Reimbursement Schemes for Hospitals: Theory and Evidence from Germany

Posted: 12 Mar 2008 Last Revised: 28 Jul 2010
Eberhard Feess, Helge Müller and Ansgar Wohlschlegel
Frankfurt School of Finance & Management gemeinnützige GmbH, RWTH Aachen University and Portsmouth Business School

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readmissions, post surgery complications, quality and cost incentives, DRG

42.

Environmental Harm and Financial Responsibility

Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice, Vol. 25, Issue 2, April 2000
Posted: 31 Aug 2000
Eberhard Feess and Ulrich Hege
Frankfurt School of Finance & Management gemeinnützige GmbH and Toulouse School of Economics

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