Eberhard Feess

Frankfurt School of Finance & Management

Adickesallee 32-34

Frankfurt am Main, 60322

Germany

  • Frankfurt School of Finance & Management

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

41

DOWNLOADS
Rank 10,687

SSRN RANKINGS

Top 10,687

in Total Papers Downloads

5,640

SSRN CITATIONS
Rank 7,147

SSRN RANKINGS

Top 7,147

in Total Papers Citations

38

CROSSREF CITATIONS

148

Scholarly Papers (41)

Actions:
Email selected abstracts
1.

The German Capital Markets Model Case Act (KapMuG) - A European Role Model For Increasing the Efficiency of Capital Markets? Analysis and Suggestions for Reform

Number of pages: 35 Posted: 01 Oct 2010 Last Revised: 21 Mar 2012
Axel Halfmeier and Eberhard Feess
Leuphana Universität Lüneburg and Frankfurt School of Finance & Management
Downloads 597 (56,676)
Citation 3

Abstract:

Loading...

Shareholder mass litigation, securities litigation, KapMuG, standard of proof

2.

Transfer Fee Regulations in European Football

Number of pages: 28 Posted: 08 Feb 2002
Gerd Muehlheusser and Eberhard Feess
University of Hamburg and Frankfurt School of Finance & Management
Downloads 460 (78,284)
Citation 4

Abstract:

Loading...

Labor Contracts, Bosman Judgement, Transfer Fees, Breach of Contract, Investment Incentives, General Skills, Externalities

3.

Corporate Leniency Programs in the EU and the USA

Number of pages: 21 Posted: 29 Apr 2003
Markus Walzl and Eberhard Feess
RWTH Aachen University - Chair for Economics (Microeconomics) and Frankfurt School of Finance & Management
Downloads 417 (87,852)
Citation 1

Abstract:

Loading...

self-reporting, optimal law enforcement, criminal teams, leniency programs

4.

The Basel Accord and the Value of Bank Differentiation

CFS Working Paper No. 2004/25, AFA 2008 New Orleans Meetings Paper
Number of pages: 68 Posted: 31 Dec 2004 Last Revised: 02 Jun 2013
Eberhard Feess and Ulrich Hege
Frankfurt School of Finance & Management and Toulouse School of Economics
Downloads 391 (94,609)
Citation 4

Abstract:

Loading...

bank capital regulation, bank failure, risk-taking, Basel Accord, internal ratings.

5.

Legal Restrictions on Buyout Fees: Theory and Evidence from German Soccer

Number of pages: 47 Posted: 07 Jul 2004
Eberhard Feess, Bernd Frick and Gerd Muehlheusser
Frankfurt School of Finance & Management, University of Witten/Herdecke - Institute of Economics and Business Administration and University of Hamburg
Downloads 363 (103,076)

Abstract:

Loading...

Labor contracts, Bosman judgement, empirical contract theory

6.

Competition, Bonuses, and Risk-Taking in the Banking Industry

Number of pages: 48 Posted: 09 Oct 2010 Last Revised: 30 Sep 2011
Christina E. Bannier, Eberhard Feess and Natalie Packham
Justus-Liebig-University Giessen, Frankfurt School of Finance & Management and Berlin School of Economics and Law
Downloads 346 (108,761)
Citation 9

Abstract:

Loading...

Bonuses, excessive risk, screening, competition

7.

Environmental Liability Under Uncertain Causation

Number of pages: 29 Posted: 06 Sep 2007
Eberhard Feess, Gerd Muehlheusser and Ansgar Wohlschlegel
Frankfurt School of Finance & Management, University of Hamburg and Portsmouth Business School
Downloads 198 (190,936)
Citation 2

Abstract:

Loading...

environmental liability, uncertainty over causation, standard of proof, threshold probabilities

8.

Patent Licensing and Price Discrimination

Number of pages: 13 Posted: 10 Jan 2006
Sandro Gleave and Eberhard Feess
Federal Cartel Office and Frankfurt School of Finance & Management
Downloads 198 (190,936)

Abstract:

Loading...

Patent licensing, Price discrimination, Endogenous valuation

9.

Academic Copyright in the Publishing Game: A Contest Perspective

Number of pages: 31 Posted: 29 Mar 2011 Last Revised: 25 May 2014
Eberhard Feess and Marc Scheufen
Frankfurt School of Finance & Management and Ruhr University Bochum
Downloads 184 (203,795)
Citation 4

Abstract:

Loading...

Open Access, Copyright, Economics of Science, Publishing Game, Tullock Contest

10.

Contracts as Rent Seeking Devices: Evidence from German Soccer

Downloads 173 (214,971)
Citation 2

Contracts as Rent Seeking Devices: Evidence from German Soccer

IZA Discussion Paper No. 3834
Number of pages: 35 Posted: 25 Nov 2008
Eberhard Feess, Michael Gerfin and Gerd Muehlheusser
Frankfurt School of Finance & Management, University of Bern and University of Hamburg
Downloads 173 (215,109)

Abstract:

Loading...

strategic contracting, rent seeking, empirical contract theory, long-term contracts, breach of contract, sports economics

Contracts as Rent‐Seeking Devices: Evidence from German Soccer

Economic Inquiry, Vol. 53, Issue 1, pp. 714-730, 2015
Number of pages: 17 Posted: 21 Nov 2014
Eberhard Feess, Michael Gerfin and Gerd Muehlheusser
Frankfurt School of Finance & Management, University of Bern and University of Hamburg
Downloads 0
Citation 1
  • Add to Cart

Abstract:

Loading...

11.

Self-Reporting in Optimal Law Enforcement When There are Criminal Teams

Downloads 169 (219,311)
Citation 9

Self-Reporting in Optimal Law Enforcement When There are Criminal Teams

Aachen Micro Working Paper 02/02
Number of pages: 24 Posted: 09 Apr 2002
Markus Walzl and Eberhard Feess
RWTH Aachen University - Chair for Economics (Microeconomics) and Frankfurt School of Finance & Management
Downloads 139 (258,564)
Citation 1

Abstract:

Loading...

self-reporting, optimal law enforcement, crime, criminal teams, corruption, leniency programs

Self-Reporting in Optimal Law Enforcement When There are Criminal Teams

Number of pages: 16 Posted: 11 Jul 2004
Eberhard Feess and Markus Walzl
Frankfurt School of Finance & Management and RWTH Aachen University - Chair for Economics (Microeconomics)
Downloads 30 (586,259)
Citation 2
  • Add to Cart

Abstract:

Loading...

12.

Corruption and Self-Reporting in Optimal Law Enforcement

Aachen Micro Working Paper No. 5
Number of pages: 19 Posted: 30 Nov 2001
Markus Walzl and Eberhard Feess
RWTH Aachen University - Chair for Economics (Microeconomics) and Frankfurt School of Finance & Management
Downloads 169 (219,311)

Abstract:

Loading...

self-reporting, optimal law enforcement, corruption

13.

Should Principals Reveal Their Private Information?

Aachen Micro Working Paper No. 4/01
Number of pages: 19 Posted: 30 Nov 2001
Markus Walzl, Eberhard Feess and Michael Schieble
RWTH Aachen University - Chair for Economics (Microeconomics), Frankfurt School of Finance & Management and Bain & Company - Munich Office
Downloads 134 (265,182)

Abstract:

Loading...

information revelation, hidden action, limited liability, informed principal

14.

Reporter's Privilege and Incentives to Leak

Number of pages: 21 Posted: 14 Mar 2007 Last Revised: 07 Oct 2008
Ido Baum, Eberhard Feess and Ansgar Wohlschlegel
Haim Striks School of Law - College of Management, Frankfurt School of Finance & Management and Portsmouth Business School
Downloads 126 (277,656)

Abstract:

Loading...

Whistle-blowing, reporter's privilege, burden of proof, errors in court

15.

Do Moral Transgressions Lead to Pro-Social Effort? A Real-Effort Experiment

Number of pages: 34 Posted: 13 Aug 2018 Last Revised: 07 Jul 2020
Eberhard Feess and Roee Sarel
Frankfurt School of Finance & Management and Institute of Law and Economics, University of Hamburg
Downloads 121 (286,112)

Abstract:

Loading...

Moral licensing, conscience accounting, licensing effect, stable preferences, real effort

16.

Regulating Product Return Policies: The Trade-off between Efficiency and Distribution

Number of pages: 63 Posted: 19 Dec 2018 Last Revised: 18 Mar 2021
Samuel Becher, Eberhard Feess and Roee Sarel
Victoria University of Wellington, Frankfurt School of Finance & Management and Institute of Law and Economics, University of Hamburg
Downloads 118 (293,006)

Abstract:

Loading...

product returns, return policy, consumer protection, consumer uncertainty, cancellations, withdrawals

17.

All-Unit Discounts and the Problem of Surplus Division

Number of pages: 19 Posted: 16 Dec 2007 Last Revised: 20 Feb 2010
Eberhard Feess and Ansgar Wohlschlegel
Frankfurt School of Finance & Management and Portsmouth Business School
Downloads 111 (304,019)

Abstract:

Loading...

Discounts, Abuse of Market Dominance, Foreclosure, Rent Shifting, Exclusive Dealing.

18.

When Bidding More is Not Enough: All-Pay Auctions with Handicaps

Bonn Econ. Discussion Paper No. 14/2002
Number of pages: 23 Posted: 21 Aug 2002
Markus Walzl, Eberhard Feess and Gerd Muehlheusser
RWTH Aachen University - Chair for Economics (Microeconomics), Frankfurt School of Finance & Management and University of Hamburg
Downloads 111 (304,019)

Abstract:

Loading...

All-pay auction, contest, asymmetric allocation rule, rent-seeking, asymmetric information

19.

On the Optimal Design of Unfair Contests

Number of pages: 27 Posted: 30 Oct 2002
Markus Walzl, Eberhard Feess and Gerd Muehlheusser
RWTH Aachen University - Chair for Economics (Microeconomics), Frankfurt School of Finance & Management and University of Hamburg
Downloads 104 (317,946)
Citation 8

Abstract:

Loading...

Asymmetric contests, asymmetric information, contest design

20.

Screening in Courts: On the Joint Use of Negligence and Causation Standards

Number of pages: 25 Posted: 13 Dec 2007 Last Revised: 02 Sep 2008
Eberhard Feess, Gerd Muehlheusser and Ansgar Wohlschlegel
Frankfurt School of Finance & Management, University of Hamburg and Portsmouth Business School
Downloads 98 (330,547)

Abstract:

Loading...

liability rules, uncertainty over causation, negligence, threshold probabilities, screening

21.

International Technology Transfers and Competition

Downloads 95 (337,278)
Citation 5

International Technology Transfers and Competition

Number of pages: 23 Posted: 26 Nov 2006
Eberhard Feess, Michael Hoeck and Oliver Lorz
Frankfurt School of Finance & Management, Proyecta Ventures GmbH and RWTH Aachen University
Downloads 92 (346,881)
Citation 1

Abstract:

Loading...

technology licensing, international technology transfers, oligopoly

International Technology Transfers and Competition

Review of International Economics, Vol. 17, Issue 5, pp. 1038-1052, November 2009
Number of pages: 15 Posted: 02 Nov 2009
Eberhard Feess, Michael Hoeck and Oliver Lorz
Frankfurt School of Finance & Management, Proyecta Ventures GmbH and RWTH Aachen University
Downloads 3 (799,776)
  • Add to Cart

Abstract:

Loading...

22.

Mandatory Deferral of Banker Compensation and Misallocation of Risky Projects

Number of pages: 31 Posted: 29 Jul 2012 Last Revised: 30 Jul 2012
Eberhard Feess and Ansgar Wohlschlegel
Frankfurt School of Finance & Management and Portsmouth Business School
Downloads 93 (341,793)
Citation 3

Abstract:

Loading...

Deferred Bonuses, risk-shifting, financial crisis, Executive compensation

23.

Judicial Effort and the Appeal System: Theory and Experiment

Number of pages: 64 Posted: 27 Sep 2017 Last Revised: 30 Sep 2019
Eberhard Feess and Roee Sarel
Frankfurt School of Finance & Management and Institute of Law and Economics, University of Hamburg
Downloads 88 (353,875)
Citation 5

Abstract:

Loading...

Judges, Appeals, Effort, Experimental Law and Economics

24.

Why are Corrupt Countries Less Successful in Consolidating Their Budgets?

Number of pages: 32 Posted: 08 Sep 2009
K. Peren Arin, Viera Chmelarova, Eberhard Feess and Ansgar Wohlschlegel
Zayed University, European Central Bank (ECB), Frankfurt School of Finance & Management and Portsmouth Business School
Downloads 82 (369,303)

Abstract:

Loading...

Corruption, Fiscal consolidation, Binary choice models, Panel data

25.

The Impact of Fine Size and Uncertainty on Punishment and Deterrence: Evidence from the Laboratory

Number of pages: 40 Posted: 11 Jul 2014
Eberhard Feess, Markus Schramm and Ansgar Wohlschlegel
Frankfurt School of Finance & Management, RWTH Aachen University and Portsmouth Business School
Downloads 79 (377,432)
Citation 4

Abstract:

Loading...

Deterrence, fine size, type-I and type-II error, experiment

26.

Optimal Self-Reporting Schemes with Multiple Stages and Option Values

Number of pages: 21 Posted: 03 Sep 2002
Markus Walzl and Eberhard Feess
RWTH Aachen University - Chair for Economics (Microeconomics) and Frankfurt School of Finance & Management
Downloads 76 (385,918)
Citation 3

Abstract:

Loading...

self-reporting, tax amnesties, optimal law enforcement, ex post asymmetric information

27.

Delegated Expertise - When are Good Projects Bad News?

Number of pages: 8 Posted: 20 Jan 2003
Markus Walzl and Eberhard Feess
RWTH Aachen University - Chair for Economics (Microeconomics) and Frankfurt School of Finance & Management
Downloads 74 (391,712)
Citation 6

Abstract:

Loading...

delegated expertise, information revelation, hidden action, limited liability

28.

Why Higher Price Sensitivity of Consumers May Increase Average Prices: An Analysis of the European Electricity Market

FCN Working Paper No. 16/2010
Number of pages: 27 Posted: 19 Dec 2010
Tobias Paulun, Eberhard Feess and Reinhard Madlener
RWTH Aachen University - Institute of Power Systems and Power Economics, Frankfurt School of Finance & Management and RWTH Aachen University
Downloads 73 (394,665)
Citation 84

Abstract:

Loading...

Electricity Market, Price Sensitivity, Heterogenous Oligopoly, Price Competition, Capacity Constraints

29.

The Impact of Truth-Telling and Limited Wealth in a Principal-Agent Model

Schmalenbach Business Review, Vol. 57, 2005
Number of pages: 18 Posted: 09 Mar 2005
Eberhard Feess, Sonja Ossig and Markus Walzl
Frankfurt School of Finance & Management, RWTH Aachen University - Faculty of Economics and University of Maastricht - Department of Economics
Downloads 71 (400,814)

Abstract:

Loading...

Delegated expertise, limited liability, moral hazard, principal-agent theory

30.

Under-Delegation in Case of Pure Moral Hazard: Evidence from the Laboratory

Number of pages: 37 Posted: 11 Jul 2014
Eberhard Feess, Oliver Lorz and Markus Schramm
Frankfurt School of Finance & Management, RWTH Aachen University and RWTH Aachen University
Downloads 59 (440,781)
Citation 1

Abstract:

Loading...

Moral hazard, gender, control premium, delegation, principal-agent, experiment, real-effort

31.

The Impact of Heterogeneity on the Optimal Self-Reporting Scheme

Number of pages: 12 Posted: 07 Oct 2002
Markus Walzl and Eberhard Feess
RWTH Aachen University - Chair for Economics (Microeconomics) and Frankfurt School of Finance & Management
Downloads 58 (444,429)

Abstract:

Loading...

self-reporting, tax amnesties, optimal law enforcement, ex post asymmetric information

32.

The Impact of Fine Size and Uncertainty on Punishment and Deterrence: Theory and Evidence from the Laboratory

IZA Discussion Paper No. 9388
Number of pages: 31 Posted: 12 Oct 2015
Eberhard Feess, Hannah Schildberg-Hörisch, Markus Schramm and Ansgar Wohlschlegel
Frankfurt School of Finance & Management, Heinrich-Heine-Universität Düsseldorf, RWTH Aachen University and Portsmouth Business School
Downloads 56 (451,860)
Citation 2

Abstract:

Loading...

deterrence, punishment, legal uncertainty, fines, laboratory experiment, partial and equilibrium effects

33.

Incentive Schemes, Private Information and the Double-Edged Role of Competition for Agents

Number of pages: 56 Posted: 03 Jan 2013 Last Revised: 12 Jul 2016
Christina E. Bannier, Eberhard Feess, Natalie Packham and Markus Walzl
Justus-Liebig-University Giessen, Frankfurt School of Finance & Management, Berlin School of Economics and Law and University of Innsbruck
Downloads 52 (466,881)
Citation 2

Abstract:

Loading...

Incentive compensation, screening, imperfect labor market competition, vertical differentiation, horizontal differentiation, risk aversion

34.

Bank Capital Requirements and Mandatory Deferral of Compensation

Number of pages: 30 Posted: 24 Jul 2014
Eberhard Feess and Ansgar Wohlschlegel
Frankfurt School of Finance & Management and Portsmouth Business School
Downloads 50 (474,941)

Abstract:

Loading...

Bank capital requirements, deferred bonuses, risk-shifting, financial crisis, executive compensation.

35.

Monitoring Reduces Efficiency: Evidence from the Laboratory

Number of pages: 34 Posted: 11 Jul 2014
Eberhard Feess and Markus Schramm
Frankfurt School of Finance & Management and RWTH Aachen University
Downloads 34 (549,238)

Abstract:

Loading...

Monitoring, delegation, control premium, laboratory experiment

36.

Optimal Law Enforcement with Sophisticated and Naive Offenders

CESifo Working Paper Series No. 7106
Number of pages: 34 Posted: 09 Aug 2018
Berno Buechel, Eberhard Feess and Gerd Muehlheusser
University of Fribourg - Faculty of Economics and Social Science, Frankfurt School of Finance & Management and University of Hamburg
Downloads 7 (735,159)
Citation 3

Abstract:

Loading...

optimal law enforcement, deterrence, behavioral law & economics, naïveté, shrouding

37.

Moral Hazard, Risk Sharing, and the Optimal Pool Size

Journal of Risk and Insurance, Vol. 86, Issue 2, pp. 297-313, 2019
Number of pages: 17 Posted: 11 May 2019
Frauke von Bieberstein, Eberhard Feess, José F. Fernando, Florian Kerzenmacher and Jörg Schiller
University of Bern, Frankfurt School of Finance & Management, Universidad Complutense de Madrid (UCM), Frankfurt School of Finance & Management and University of Hohenheim
Downloads 2 (776,084)
  • Add to Cart

Abstract:

Loading...

38.

Revenue Sharing in Professional Sports Leagues

Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 56, Issue 2, pp. 255-265, May 2009
Number of pages: 11 Posted: 27 Apr 2009
Eberhard Feess and Frank Stähler
Frankfurt School of Finance & Management and University of Tuebingen - Department of Economics
Downloads 2 (776,084)
  • Add to Cart

Abstract:

Loading...

39.

You are One of Us Now! How Do Share Prices of Rivals React to Privatization?

The Journal of Industrial Economics, Vol. 57, Issue 2, pp. 265-293, June 2009
Number of pages: 29 Posted: 20 May 2009
Ayca Altintig, K. Peren Arin, Eberhard Feess and Christoph R. Schumacher
Claremont Colleges - Peter F. Drucker Graduate School of Management, Zayed University, Frankfurt School of Finance & Management and Massey University - Department of Commerce
Downloads 1 (787,597)
Citation 1
  • Add to Cart

Abstract:

Loading...

40.

The Impact of Religion and the Degree of Religiosity on Work Ethic: A Multilevel Analysis

Number of pages: 29 Posted: 11 Oct 2014
Eberhard Feess, Helge Mueller and Sabrina G. Ruhnau
Frankfurt School of Finance & Management, Frankfurt School of Finance & Management and Frankfurt School of Finance & Management
Downloads 0 (804,587)
  • Add to Cart

Abstract:

Loading...

41.

Reimbursement Schemes for Hospitals: Theory and Evidence from Germany

Posted: 12 Mar 2008 Last Revised: 28 Jul 2010
Eberhard Feess, Helge Müller and Ansgar Wohlschlegel
Frankfurt School of Finance & Management, RWTH Aachen University and Portsmouth Business School

Abstract:

Loading...

readmissions, post surgery complications, quality and cost incentives, DRG