United Kingdom
http://www.lse.ac.uk/management/people/ralonso.aspx
London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Department of Management
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hiring, recruitment, selection, employer testing
Persuasion, information control, heterogeneous priors
coordination, decision rights, cheap talk, incomplete contracts
delegation, relational contract, cheap talk
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Delegation, cheap talk, relational contract
adaptation, information, organization
Information Design, Bayesian Persuasion, Stress Tests, Financial Disclosure, Endogenous Public Signal
Strategic experimentation, persuasion, voting
disagreement, Bayesian persuasion, strategic experimentation, voting
Communication equilibrium, information transmission, mediation, one-shot cheap talk
Coordination, decision rights, cheap talk, incomplete contracts
Delegation, decision rights, mechanism design
employer search, hiring, recruitment, selection
Audit, Bayesian persuasion, Information Technology, Organizational design, strategic experimentation, tampering
mechanism design, multiple brain systems, neural darwinism, neuroeconomic theory
Bayesian persuasion, experts., information design
