Bank Governance, Regulation, and Risk Taking
41 Pages Posted: 11 Jun 2008
Date Written: June 2008
This paper conducts the first empirical assessment of theories concerning relationships among risk taking by banks, their ownership structures, and national bank regulations. We focus on conflicts between bank managers and owners over risk, and show that bank risk taking varies positively with the comparative power of shareholders within the corporate governance structure of each bank. Moreover, we show that the relation between bank risk and capital regulations, deposit insurance policies, and restrictions on bank activities depends critically on each bank's ownership structure, such that the actual sign of the marginal effect of regulation on risk varies with ownership concentration. These findings have important policy implications as they imply that the same regulation will have different effects on bank risk taking depending on the bank's corporate governance structure.
Keywords: financial economics, corporate finance, financial institutions, government policy
JEL Classification: G3, G2, G18
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation