Private-Collective Innovation, Competition, and Firms’ Counterintuitive Appropriation Strategies

50 Pages Posted: 7 Jul 2009 Last revised: 23 Sep 2011

See all articles by Oliver Alexy

Oliver Alexy

Technische Universität München (TUM), TUM School of Management

Markus G. Reitzig

University of Vienna

Date Written: August 20, 2011

Abstract

We extend theory on private-collective innovation by studying the role of exclusion rights for technology in the competition between private-collective and other innovators. We argue that private-collective innovators both pledge their own and invest in orphan exclusion rights for technology as a subtle coordination mechanism to compete against firms proposing alternative proprietary solutions. We discuss implications of our findings for theories of innovation, particularly appropriation strategy, ownership and control, and coordination and industry self-regulation.

Keywords: Private-collective innovation, exclusion rights, competition, appropriation strategy, interfirm coordination, control, industry self-regulation, open source software

JEL Classification: L10, O32, D23, L59, O33

Suggested Citation

Alexy, Oliver and Reitzig, Markus G., Private-Collective Innovation, Competition, and Firms’ Counterintuitive Appropriation Strategies (August 20, 2011). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1430328 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1430328

Oliver Alexy

Technische Universität München (TUM), TUM School of Management ( email )

Arcisstr. 21
Munich, 80333
Germany
+49-89-289-52803 (Phone)
+49-89-289-52899 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.ent.wi.tum.de

Markus G. Reitzig (Contact Author)

University of Vienna ( email )

Bruenner Strasse 72
Vienna, Vienna 1090
Austria

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