Collateral, Credit-History and the Financial Decelerator

Brown University Working Paper No. 98-10

23 Pages Posted: 9 Feb 1999  

Ronel Elul

Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: November 1998

Abstract

We construct a simple general equilibrium model in which agents borrow to purchase housing and secure their loans with this long-lived asset. As the housing price falls defaulting becomes a weaker signal of (poor) credit quality, since wealthier agents are forced to default. If housing prices fall sufficiently, some agents may find it in their interest to strategically default - that is, even if they actually have the funds to repay their loan.

We use the model to demonstrate that financial imperfections may sometimes stabilize real fluctuations, rather than aggravating them as suggested by much of the recent literature; we term this a financial decelerator. This occurs because strategic default leaves an agent with more income, which can be applied to purchasing housing, thereby mitigating the decline in its price.

JEL Classification: D52, E44, G12, G21, G33

Suggested Citation

Elul, Ronel, Collateral, Credit-History and the Financial Decelerator (November 1998). Brown University Working Paper No. 98-10. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=146730 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.146730

Ronel Elul (Contact Author)

Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia ( email )

Ten Independence Mall
Philadelphia, PA 19106-1574
United States
215-574-3965 (Phone)

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