Do Unions Make Enterprises Insolvent?

Posted: 10 May 1999

See all articles by Richard B. Freeman

Richard B. Freeman

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); University of Edinburgh - School of Social and Political Studies; Harvard University; London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Centre for Economic Performance (CEP)

Morris M. Kleiner

Humphrey School of Public Affairs; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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Abstract

This study investigates the impact of unionization on closures of firms, business lines, and establishments. Analyzing data from two major data sets--one (from the COMPUSTAT files) on the union status of solvent and insolvent enterprises and business lines, and one (obtained by matching files from the Current Population Survey) on the union status of workers who have lost their jobs due to permanent plant closures or business failures--the authors find little support for the hypothesis that unionization increases the insolvency of firms. The results are consistent with the hypothesis that unions behave in an economically rational manner, pushing wages to the point where union firms may expand less rapidly than non-union firms, but not to the point where the firm, plant, or business line closes down.

JEL Classification: J51, J53, L22

Suggested Citation

Freeman, Richard B. and Kleiner, Morris M., Do Unions Make Enterprises Insolvent?. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=156330

Richard B. Freeman

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Morris M. Kleiner (Contact Author)

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