Circles of Trust: Rival Information in Social Networks

24 Pages Posted: 9 Jan 2011 Last revised: 23 Sep 2021

See all articles by Petra Persson

Petra Persson

Stanford University; Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)

Nikita Roketskiy

University College London - Department of Economics

Samuel Lee

Santa Clara University - Leavey School of Business; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); Swedish House of Finance

Multiple version iconThere are 3 versions of this paper

Date Written: September 22, 2021

Abstract

We analyze the diffusion of rival information in a social network. In our model, rational agents can share information sequentially, unconstrained by an exogenous protocol or timing. We show how to compute the set of eventually informed agents for any network, and show that it is essentially unique under altruistic preferences. The relationship between network structure and information diffusion is complex because the former shapes both the charity and confidentiality of potential senders and receivers.

Keywords: Information sharing, communication, directed altruism, trust, secrecy, network formation

JEL Classification: D83, D85

Suggested Citation

Persson, Petra and Roketskiy, Nikita and Lee, Samuel, Circles of Trust: Rival Information in Social Networks (September 22, 2021). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1736200 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1736200

Petra Persson

Stanford University ( email )

Stanford, CA 94305
United States

Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN) ( email )

Box 55665
Grevgatan 34, 2nd floor
Stockholm, SE-102 15
Sweden

Nikita Roketskiy

University College London - Department of Economics ( email )

Gower Street
London WC1E 6BT, WC1E 6BT
United Kingdom

Samuel Lee (Contact Author)

Santa Clara University - Leavey School of Business

500 El Camino Real
Santa Clara, CA California 95053
United States

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

Swedish House of Finance ( email )

Drottninggatan 98
111 60 Stockholm
Sweden

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
23
Abstract Views
2,233
PlumX Metrics