How Can Bill and Melinda Gates Increase Other People's Donations to Fund Public Goods?

25 Pages Posted: 31 Mar 2012 Last revised: 22 Jan 2025

See all articles by Dean S. Karlan

Dean S. Karlan

Yale University; Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management; Innovations for Poverty Action; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab (J-PAL); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

John A. List

University of Chicago - Department of Economics

Multiple version iconThere are 3 versions of this paper

Date Written: March 2012

Abstract

We conducted a fundraising experiment with an international development nonprofit organization in which a matching grant offered by the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation raised more funds than one from an anonymous donor. The effect is strongest for solicitees who previously gave to other BMGF-supported, poverty charities. With supporting evidence from two other fundraising experiments as well as a survey experiment, we argue this is consistent with a quality signal mechanism. Alternative mechanisms are discussed, and not ruled out. The results help inform theories about charitable giving decision-making, and provide guidance to organizations and large donors on how to overcome information asymmetries hindering fundraising.

Suggested Citation

Karlan, Dean S. and Karlan, Dean S. and List, John A., How Can Bill and Melinda Gates Increase Other People's Donations to Fund Public Goods? (March 2012). NBER Working Paper No. w17954, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2031962

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