42 Pages Posted: 28 Sep 2012
Date Written: June 2012
This paper presents results from a laboratory experiment on the channels through which different law enforcement strategies deter cartel formation. With leniency policies offering immunity to the first reporting party a high fine is the main determinant of deterrence, having a strong effect even when the probability of exogenous detection is zero. Deterrence appears then mainly driven by 'distrust', the fear of partners deviating and reporting. Absent leniency, the probability of detection and the expected fine matter the most, and low fines are exploited to punish defections. The results appear relevant to several other crimes sharing cartels' strategic features, including corruption and financial fraud.
Keywords: Antitrust, Betrayal, Cartels, Collusion, Distrust, Fines, Leniency, Whistleblowers
JEL Classification: C92, D03, K21, K42, L41
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Bigoni, Maria and Fridolfsson, Sven-Olof and Le Coq, Chloe and Spagnolo, Giancarlo, Trust and Deterrence (June 2012). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP9002. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2153434
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