Category Spanning, Evaluation, and Performance: Revised Theory and Test on the Corporate Law Market

Academy of Management Journal, 59, 330-351

22 Pages Posted: 4 Aug 2015 Last revised: 4 Aug 2016

See all articles by Lionel Paolella

Lionel Paolella

University of Cambridge- Judge Business School

Rodolphe Durand

HEC Paris - Strategy & Business Policy

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: 2016

Abstract

Studies suggest that category-spanning organizations receive lower evaluation and perform worse than organizations focused on a single category. We propose that (1) these effects are contingent on clients’ theory of value and that as clients expect more sophisticated services, they tend to value category spanners more positively and (2) the evaluation of producers mediates the relationship between category spanning and performance. We test our hypotheses using original data on corporate legal services in three markets (London, New York City, and Paris) over the decade 2000-2010. We find that (1) category spanners receive a better evaluation, and more so when their categorical combination is more inclusive and (2) evaluation mediates significantly the relationship between category spanning and performance. This study enriches our understanding of how audiences apprehend a whole market category system and why organizations span categories.

Keywords: category, evaluation, performance, mediation, law firms

Suggested Citation

Paolella, Lionel and Durand, Rodolphe, Category Spanning, Evaluation, and Performance: Revised Theory and Test on the Corporate Law Market (2016). Academy of Management Journal, 59, 330-351, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2639194

Lionel Paolella (Contact Author)

University of Cambridge- Judge Business School ( email )

Trumpington Street
Cambridge, CB2 1AG
United Kingdom

HOME PAGE: http://www.jbs.cam.ac.uk/faculty-research/faculty-a-z/lionel-paolella/

Rodolphe Durand

HEC Paris - Strategy & Business Policy ( email )

Jouy-en-Josas Cedex, 78351
France

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