Incumbent Behavior: Vote Seeking, Tax Setting and Yardstick Competition
44 Pages Posted: 27 Dec 2001 Last revised: 18 Jul 2022
Date Written: March 1992
Abstract
This paper presents a theoretical and empirical investigation of tax competition when voters use the tax policy of neighboring jurisdictions as information to evaluate the performance of their incumbent politicians. We show that this has implications both for voter tolerance of high taxes and for the process of tax setting itself, Our empirical results, which use two different tax data sets, confirm the importance of neighbors' taxes both on the probability of incumbent reelection and on tax setting behavior.
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