Intention-based Social Influence in Sharing Experiments

41 Pages Posted: 24 Oct 2017 Last revised: 8 Oct 2018

See all articles by Daniela Di Cagno

Daniela Di Cagno

LUISS, Rome

Werner Güth

Max Planck Society for the Advancement of the Sciences - Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods; Luiss Guido Carli University

Marcello Puca

University of Bergamo; Webster University - Webster University Geneva

Patrizia Sbriglia

University of Campania - LUIGI VANVITELLI

Date Written: October 1, 2018

Abstract

Abstract We experimentally study intention-based social influence of group members on behavior in standard and modified Ultimatum and Impunity games. Standard games allow for bi-dimensional strategy vectors whereas they are uni-dimensional in modified games. The latter reveal more clearly fairness intention that should strengthen social influence. Groups are minimally identified by colors and social influence is based on information about median intention(s) in one's group. These affect bi-dimensional Ultimatum bargaining significantly more than Impunity giving suggesting: sharing triggered by intrinsic generosity is less sensitive to social influence than sharing with strategic concerns. Altogether, social influence enhances conformity seeking and thereby efficiency, but its effect is strongly role dependent.

Keywords: Ultimatum Game, Impunity Game, Social Influence, Intentions, Group Identity, Fairness, Experiments

JEL Classification: C90, C91

Suggested Citation

Di Cagno, Daniela and Güth, Werner and Puca, Marcello and Sbriglia, Patrizia, Intention-based Social Influence in Sharing Experiments (October 1, 2018). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3057986 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3057986

Daniela Di Cagno

LUISS, Rome ( email )

00162 Rome, Roma
Italy

HOME PAGE: http://www.luiss.it/facolta/insegnamenti/curriculu

Werner Güth

Max Planck Society for the Advancement of the Sciences - Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Kurt-Schumacher-Str. 10
D-53113 Bonn, 53113
Germany

Luiss Guido Carli University ( email )

Via O. Tommasini 1
Rome, Roma 00100
Italy

Marcello Puca (Contact Author)

University of Bergamo ( email )

Via dei Caniana 2
Bergamo, 24127
Italy

Webster University - Webster University Geneva ( email )

Route de Collex 15
Bellevue, CH- 1293
Switzerland

Patrizia Sbriglia

University of Campania - LUIGI VANVITELLI ( email )

Gran Priorato di Malta
Caserta CE, Caserta 83100
Italy

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