CEO Stress, Aging, and Death

101 Pages Posted: 11 Aug 2023

See all articles by Mark Borgschulte

Mark Borgschulte

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign - Department of Economics

Marius Guenzel

University of Pennsylvania

Canyao Liu

Yale University

Ulrike Malmendier

University of California, Berkeley - Department of Economics; University of California, Berkeley - Haas School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

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Abstract

We assess the long-term effects of managerial stress on aging and mortality. First, we show that exposure to industry distress shocks during the Great Recession produces visible signs of aging in CEOs. Applying neural-network based machine-learning techniques to pre- and post-distress pictures, we estimate an increase in so-called apparent age by one year. Second, using data on CEOs since the mid-1970s, we estimate a 1.1-year decrease in life expectancy after an industry distress shock, but a two-year increase when anti-takeover laws insulate CEOs from market discipline. The estimated health costs are significant, also relative to other known health risks.

Keywords: managerial stress, life expectancy, apparent-age estimation, job demands, industry distress, visual machine-learning, corporate governance

JEL Classification: G34, I12, M12

Suggested Citation

Borgschulte, Mark and Guenzel, Marius and Liu, Canyao and Malmendier, Ulrike, CEO Stress, Aging, and Death. IZA Discussion Paper No. 16366, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4538030 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4538030

Mark Borgschulte (Contact Author)

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign - Department of Economics ( email )

601 E John St
Champaign, IL Champaign 61820
United States

Marius Guenzel

University of Pennsylvania ( email )

Philadelphia, PA 19104
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Canyao Liu

Yale University ( email )

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New Haven, CT CT 06520
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Ulrike Malmendier

University of California, Berkeley - Department of Economics ( email )

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Berkeley, CA 94720-3880
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HOME PAGE: http://www.econ.berkeley.edu/~ulrike/

University of California, Berkeley - Haas School of Business ( email )

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National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

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Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

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European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

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