The Tradeoffs of Transparency: Measuring Inequality When Subjects Are Told They Are in an Experiment

53 Pages Posted: 19 Feb 2024 Last revised: 1 May 2024

See all articles by Amanda Y. Agan

Amanda Y. Agan

Rutgers University, Department of Economics

Bo Cowgill

Columbia University - Columbia Business School

Laura Gee

Tufts University; IZA

Date Written: February 6, 2024

Abstract

Correspondence audit studies have sent almost one-hundred-thousand resumes without informing subjects they are in a study --- increasing realism, but without being fully transparent. We study the potential trade-offs of this lack of transparency by running a hiring field experiment with recruiters in a natural setting. One group of recruiters is told they are screening for an employer, and another is told they are part of an academic study. Job applicants' gender is randomly assigned. When subjects are told they are in an experiment, callback rates and willingness-to-pay for male candidates decline relative to female candidates (with no detectable change for female candidates). This suggests that telling subjects they are in an experiment would underestimate gender inequality.

Keywords: Field Experiments, Methodology, Gender, Discrimination

JEL Classification: J7, C9, D9

Suggested Citation

Agan, Amanda Y. and Cowgill, Bo and Gee, Laura, The Tradeoffs of Transparency: Measuring Inequality When Subjects Are Told They Are in an Experiment (February 6, 2024). Columbia Business School Research Paper No. 4718786, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4718786 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4718786

Amanda Y. Agan

Rutgers University, Department of Economics ( email )

New Jersey Hall
75 Hamilton St
08901, NJ Princeton 08540
United States

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/site/amandayagan/

Bo Cowgill (Contact Author)

Columbia University - Columbia Business School ( email )

3022 Broadway
New York, NY 10027
United States

Laura Gee

Tufts University ( email )

Medford, MA 02155
United States

IZA

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

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