Strategic Best-Response Fairness Framework for Fair Machine Learning

33 Pages Posted: 2 Aug 2024

See all articles by Hajime Shimao

Hajime Shimao

Santa Fe Institute

Warut Khern-am-nuai

McGill University - Desautels Faculty of Management

Karthik Natarajan Kannan

Purdue University

Maxime C. Cohen

Desautels Faculty of Management, McGill University

Date Written: July 24, 2024

Abstract

Discrimination in machine learning (ML) has become prominent as ML is increasingly used for decision-making. Although many "fair-ML" algorithms have been designed to address such discrimination issues, virtually all of them focus on alleviating disparity in the prediction results by imposing additional constraints. Naturally, in response, prediction subjects alter their behaviors. However, the algorithms never consider those behavioral responses. So, even if the disparity in prediction results may be removed, the disparity in behaviors may persist across different subpopulations of prediction subjects. When these biased behavioral outcomes are used for training ML algorithms, they can perpetuate discrimination in the long run. To study this issue, we define a new notion called "strategic best-response fairness" (SBR-fairness). It is defined in a context involving subpopulations that are ex-ante identical and also have identical conditional payoffs. Even if an algorithm is trained on biased data, will it lead to identical equilibrium behaviors of subpopulations? If yes, we define the ML as SBR-fair. We then use this SBR-fairness framework to analyze the property of existing fair ML algorithms. We also discuss how the SBR-fairness framework can inform the design of fair ML algorithms and the practical and policy implications of SBR-fairness.

Keywords: machine learning, discrimination, fairness, economic model

Suggested Citation

Shimao, Hajime and Khern-am-nuai, Warut and Kannan, Karthik Natarajan and Cohen, Maxime C., Strategic Best-Response Fairness Framework for Fair Machine Learning (July 24, 2024). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4903939

Hajime Shimao

Santa Fe Institute ( email )

1399 Hyde Park Road
Santa Fe, NM 87501
United States

Warut Khern-am-nuai (Contact Author)

McGill University - Desautels Faculty of Management ( email )

1001 Sherbrooke St. West
Montreal, Quebec H3A1G5 H3A 1G5
Canada

Karthik Natarajan Kannan

Purdue University ( email )

Krannert School of Management
West Lafayette, IN 47907
United States

Maxime C. Cohen

Desautels Faculty of Management, McGill University ( email )

1001 Sherbrooke St. W
Montreal, Quebec H3A 1G5
Canada

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