Executive Compensation, Firm Performance and Chaebols in Korea: Evidence from New Panel Data
34 Pages Posted: 25 Oct 2005
Date Written: September 2005
This paper provides the first rigorous econometric estimates on the pay-performance relations for executives of Korean firms with and without Chaebol affiliation. To do so, we have assembled for the first time a pooled cross-sectional time-series dataset on 251 firms that were included in KOSPI200 for at least two consecutive years from 1998 to 2001. Contrary to a popular belief that Korean corporate governance and the structure of Korean executive compensation is considerably different from elsewhere in the West, we find that cash compensation of Korean executives is statistically significantly related to stock market performance and that the magnitude of the sensitivity of pay to stock market performance is comparable to the U.S. and Japan. Moreover, alternative performance measures (such as accounting performance and sales) are found to play a less important role in the determination of Korean executive compensation. Finally, we find evidence that non-Chaebol firms structure their executive compensation so as to reward their executives for improving shareholder value more so than Chaebol firms. The evidence is consistent with the recent literature on the nature of Chaebols in Korea and the current corporate governance reform efforts in Korea that are aimed mostly at Chaebol firms.
Keywords: executive compensation, corporate governance, Korea, and Chaebol
JEL Classification: M12, M52, J33, G15, G30, O53
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