Managerial Versus Entrepreneurial Firms: The Benefits of Separating Ownership and Control
Schmalenbach Business Review, Vol. 56, pp. 2-19, January 2004
18 Pages Posted: 6 Jun 2004
Abstract
Agency theory emphasizes that separating ownership and control can lead to inefficiencies in corporations, but the literature on strategic delegation points out that the owner will profit from this separation due to advantages from self-commitment. In this paper, both literatures are combined. The results show that strategic delegation can be even more profitable in the presence of agency problems. Furthermore, delegating takeover decisions to managers yields positive welfare effects.
Keywords: Agency theory, strategic delegation, takeovers
JEL Classification: L1, M2
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?
Recommended Papers
-
Second-Mover Advantage and Price Leadership in Bertrand Oligopoly
By Rabah Amir and Anna Stepanova
-
Strategic Delegation and Mergers in Oligopolistic Contests
By Matthias Kräkel and Dirk Sliwka
-
By Kai A. Konrad, Steffen Huck, ...
-
Commitment, First-Mover-, and Second-Mover Advantage
By Michael Kopel and Clemens Löffler
-
Delegation in an R&D Game with Spillovers
By Michael Kopel and Christian Riegler
-
Optimal R&D Investment Strategies with Quantity Competition Under the Threat of Superior Entry
By Joseph Plasmans, Ruslan Lukach, ...
-
Endogenous Timing and Strategic Managerial Incentives in a Duopoly Game
By Michael Kopel and Clemens Löffler
-
Trash it or Sell it? A Strategic Analysis of the Market Introduction of Product Innovations
By Herbert Dawid, Michael Kopel, ...