The Internal Job Market of the Imf's Economist Program

Barron, Gregory M.; Várdy, Felix

Download This Paper

Open PDF in Browser

Add Paper to My Library

The Internal Job Market of the Imf's Economist Program

IMF Working Paper No. 04/190

28 Pages Posted: 9 Feb 2006

See all articles by Gregory M. Barron

Gregory M. Barron

Harvard Business School - Negotiation, Organizations & Markets Unit; Lax Sebenius LLC

Felix Várdy

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute); International Monetary Fund (IMF)

Date Written: October 2004

Abstract

This paper shows how the internal job market for participants in the IMF Economist Program (EPs) could be redesigned to eliminate most of the shortcomings of the current system. The new design is based on Gale and Shapley`s (1962) Deferred Acceptance Algorithm (DAA) and generates an efficient and stable outcome. An Excel-based computer program, EP-Match, implements the algorithm and applies it to the internal job market for EPs. The program can be downloaded from http://www.people.hbs.edu/gbarron/EP-Match_for_Excel.html.

Keywords: Matching, stability, marriage problem, deferred acceptance algorithm, Gale-Shapley, entry-level job market

JEL Classification: C78, D73

Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation

Barron, Gregory M. and Barron, Gregory M. and Várdy, Felix, The Internal Job Market of the Imf's Economist Program (October 2004). IMF Working Paper No. 04/190, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=879015