The Internal Job Market of the Imf's Economist Program

28 Pages Posted: 9 Feb 2006

See all articles by Gregory M. Barron

Gregory M. Barron

Lax Sebenius LLC; Harvard Business School - Negotiation, Organizations & Markets Unit

Felix Várdy

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Date Written: October 2004

Abstract

This paper shows how the internal job market for participants in the IMF Economist Program (EPs) could be redesigned to eliminate most of the shortcomings of the current system. The new design is based on Gale and Shapley`s (1962) Deferred Acceptance Algorithm (DAA) and generates an efficient and stable outcome. An Excel-based computer program, EP-Match, implements the algorithm and applies it to the internal job market for EPs. The program can be downloaded from http://www.people.hbs.edu/gbarron/EP-Match_for_Excel.html.

Keywords: Matching, stability, marriage problem, deferred acceptance algorithm, Gale-Shapley, entry-level job market

JEL Classification: C78, D73

Suggested Citation

Barron, Gregory M. and Várdy, Felix, The Internal Job Market of the Imf's Economist Program (October 2004). IMF Working Paper No. 04/190. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=879015

Gregory M. Barron

Lax Sebenius LLC ( email )

200 Baker Avenue, Suite 301
Concord, MA 01742
United States
9782875007 (Phone)

Harvard Business School - Negotiation, Organizations & Markets Unit ( email )

Soldiers Field
Boston, MA 02163
United States

Felix Várdy (Contact Author)

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute) ( email )

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

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