An Analysis of the Selection of Arbitrators

42 Pages Posted: 11 Apr 2007 Last revised: 26 Oct 2022

See all articles by David E. Bloom

David E. Bloom

Harvard University - T.H. Chan School of Public Health; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Christopher L. Cavanagh

Harvard University

Date Written: June 1986

Abstract

This paper analyses data on union and employer rankings of different panels of arbitrators in an actual arbitration system. A random utility model of bargainer preferences is developed and estimated. The estimates indicate that unions and employers have similar preferences, in favor of lawyers, more experienced arbitrators, and arbitrators who seem to have previously favored their side. Alternative rankings models, which are estimated to test whether bargainers rank arbitrators strategically, reveal no evidence of strategic behavior.

Suggested Citation

Bloom, David E. and Cavanagh, Christopher L., An Analysis of the Selection of Arbitrators (June 1986). NBER Working Paper No. w1938, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=979501

David E. Bloom (Contact Author)

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Christopher L. Cavanagh

Harvard University

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