An Analysis of the Selection of Arbitrators
42 Pages Posted: 11 Apr 2007 Last revised: 26 Oct 2022
Date Written: June 1986
Abstract
This paper analyses data on union and employer rankings of different panels of arbitrators in an actual arbitration system. A random utility model of bargainer preferences is developed and estimated. The estimates indicate that unions and employers have similar preferences, in favor of lawyers, more experienced arbitrators, and arbitrators who seem to have previously favored their side. Alternative rankings models, which are estimated to test whether bargainers rank arbitrators strategically, reveal no evidence of strategic behavior.
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