Taxes, Fringe Benefits and Faculty

35 Pages Posted: 4 Jul 2004 Last revised: 18 Apr 2022

See all articles by Daniel S. Hamermesh

Daniel S. Hamermesh

University of Texas at Austin - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Stephen Woodbury

Michigan State University; W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research

Date Written: September 1990

Abstract

The growth of employee benefits in academe has closely paralleled their economy-wide growth. This study estimates a complete system describing the demand for benefits and wages using panel data on nearly 1500 institutions of higher learning. The demand for benefits is quite responsive both to changes in real income and to variations in the tax price of benefits. These conclusions are robust with respect to varying definitions of the sample aid of the tax price. They are not altered by estimates that account for unmeasured individual effects on demand. Simulations using the estimates suggest that the Tax Reform Act of 1986 sharply reduced the demand for benefits. Extrapolating the impact to the entire economy suggests that the annual flow of compensation shifted away from benefits by at least $9 billion.

Suggested Citation

Hamermesh, Daniel S. and Woodbury, Stephen, Taxes, Fringe Benefits and Faculty (September 1990). NBER Working Paper No. w3455, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=236862

Daniel S. Hamermesh (Contact Author)

University of Texas at Austin - Department of Economics ( email )

Austin, TX 78712
United States
512-475-8526 (Phone)
512-471-3510 (Fax)

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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IZA Institute of Labor Economics

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Stephen Woodbury

Michigan State University ( email )

East Lansing, MI 48824
United States
517-355-4587 (Phone)
517-432-1068 (Fax)

W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research ( email )

300 South Westnedge Avenue
Kalamazoo, MI 49007-4686
United States
269-343-5541 (Phone)

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