Concealing Prices: How Delayed Price Disclosure Influences Consumer Purchase Decisions

Abstract

This article presents the first systematic empirical investigation into a longstanding question in retail: Is it better to display prices upfront or reveal them later in the purchase process? Two large-scale field studies demonstrate that delayed price disclosure can either increase or decrease sales. Supporting lab studies reveal that one plausible explanation is that a price delay allows price beliefs to shift consumers’ internal reference prices upward or downward, creating either positive or negative price expectation disconfirmations when prices are revealed. When consumers anticipate prices should be expensive (e.g., from premium brands or upscale stores), a price delay allows price beliefs to shift price expectations upward, making purchases more likely when prices are revealed. Conversely, when consumers anticipate prices should be inexpensive (e.g., sales events or discount stores), a price delay allows price beliefs to shift price expectations downward, making purchases less likely when prices are revealed. Our findings offer retailers actionable insights on when to reveal prices to customers. In doing so, the authors contribute to the literature on price obfuscation and challenge the conventional wisdom that shopping experiences should always minimize friction.

Keywords: Price disclosure, price obfuscation, consumer expectations, pricing, retailing.