Patent Oppositions

27 Pages Posted: 26 Nov 2002

See all articles by Jonathan Levin

Jonathan Levin

Stanford Graduate School of Business; Stanford University - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Richard C. Levin

Yale University - Department of Economics

Date Written: October 2002

Abstract

In recent years, patent protection has extended into new areas, giving rise to serious concern about the lack of clear guidelines for patentability. We analyze the effect of introducing a patent opposition process that would allow patent validity to be challenged directly after a patent is granted. In many cases, such a system would avoid costly litigation at a later date. In other cases, the opposition process would increase the cost of conflict resolution, but would also reward holders of valid patents and limit the rewards to invalid patents. Our analysis suggests significant positive welfare gains from the introduction of a patent opposition process.

Keywords: patents, intellectual property, patent litigation, innovation, technology policy

JEL Classification: K41, O31, O34, O38

Suggested Citation

Levin, Jonathan D. and Levin, Richard C., Patent Oppositions (October 2002). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=351900 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.351900

Jonathan D. Levin (Contact Author)

Stanford Graduate School of Business ( email )

655 Knight Way
Stanford, CA 94305-5015
United States

Stanford University - Department of Economics ( email )

Landau Economics Building
579 Serra Mall
Stanford, CA 94305-6072
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Richard C. Levin

Yale University - Department of Economics ( email )

28 Hillhouse Ave
New Haven, CT 06520-8268
United States

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