Goal-Based Systems and Cheating: Decomposing the Role of Goal Targets, Social Comparison Framing and Financial Pay

29 Pages Posted: 6 Sep 2017 Last revised: 30 Jun 2026

See all articles by Matthew Chao

Matthew Chao

Williams College

Ian Larkin

University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - Anderson School of Management

Date Written: June 29, 2026

Abstract

Years of research have examined how goal-based incentives can increase task performance, as well as the importance of factors such as goal commitment and relevancy when using goals. However, this detailed, systemic approach has not been extended to studying how and why the use of goals can cause cheating. Despite considerable research, we therefore know little about the specific components of goal-based systems that lead to increased cheating. Our paper uses a real-effort experiment to decompose the effects of goal targets, social comparisons, and financial pay on cheating. We find that goal targets alone generate minimal cheating, but when goals are made more relevant through social comparison framing or increased marginal pay, cheating increases substantially. We advocate that future research on goals and cheating adopt a more detailed approach to the theory by testing the effects of moderators, in much the same way that has been done in the goals and performance literature. 

Keywords: Goals, social comparisons, cheating, judgment and decision making, incentive systems, ethics

JEL Classification: M50, J33

Suggested Citation

Chao, Matthew and Larkin, Ian, Goal-Based Systems and Cheating: Decomposing the Role of Goal Targets, Social Comparison Framing and Financial Pay (June 29, 2026). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3031304 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3031304

Matthew Chao

Williams College ( email )

Williamstown, MA 01267
United States

Ian Larkin (Contact Author)

University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - Anderson School of Management ( email )

110 Westwood Plaza
Los Angeles, CA 90095-1481
United States

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