How Controlling Failure Perceptions Affects Performance: Evidence from a Field Experiment

The Accounting Review, Forthcoming

60 Pages Posted: 31 Aug 2020

See all articles by Matthew A. Cronin

Matthew A. Cronin

Donald G. Costello College of Business at George Mason University

David H. Erkens

Georgetown University - McDonough School of Business

Jason D. Schloetzer

Georgetown University - Department of Accounting and Business Law

Catherine H. Tinsley

Georgetown University - McDonough School of Business

Date Written: April 9, 2020

Abstract

We conducted a clustered randomized field experiment with 20 Brazilian distributorships of a multi-national direct sales organization to examine whether controlling failure perceptions through formal communications increases performance. We used the organization’s weekly sales meetings to deliver a video-based message from the regional head that either communicates workers should view failure as a natural part of learning rather than an indictment of their ability (treatment condition) or simply summarizes the organization’s history (control condition). We find that those who were assigned to the treatment condition were more likely to sustain their effort in response to economic adversity that coincided with our experiment. Additional analyses suggest that our treatment accomplished this by increasing job-specific confidence, and by reinforcing social norms that encourage workers to persevere after failure. Overall, our findings highlight that formal communications from senior management are a viable control mechanism for sustaining effort in the face of failure.

Keywords: Personal Goals, Failure, Confidence, Organizational Messages, Performance, Social Control

JEL Classification: M12, M41, M52, M53, M54

Suggested Citation

Cronin, Matthew A. and Erkens, David Hendrik and Schloetzer, Jason D. and Tinsley, Catherine H., How Controlling Failure Perceptions Affects Performance: Evidence from a Field Experiment (April 9, 2020). The Accounting Review, Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3584712

Matthew A. Cronin

Donald G. Costello College of Business at George Mason University ( email )

Fairfax, VA 22030
United States

David Hendrik Erkens (Contact Author)

Georgetown University - McDonough School of Business ( email )

3700 O Street, NW
Washington, DC 20057
United States

Jason D. Schloetzer

Georgetown University - Department of Accounting and Business Law ( email )

McDonough School of Business
Washington, DC 20057
United States

Catherine H. Tinsley

Georgetown University - McDonough School of Business ( email )

3700 O Street, NW
Washington, DC 20057
United States
202-687-2524 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://explore.georgetown.edu/people/tinsleyc/

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