Faculty of Art and Social Sciences
Orhanli Tuzla
İstanbul, 34956
Turkey
Sabanci University
Market Design, Matching, Maximal Matching, Fairness, Object Allocation, School Choice
Arbiter, arbitration, assignment, depth optimality, dispute resolution, fairness, football, mechanism, referee, sports, strategy-proofness, unanimity compromise
Matching markets, deferred acceptance, information acquisition, game the- ory, lab experiment
Bilateral substitutes, Unilateral substitutes, Substitutes, Doctor separability, Pareto separability, Irrelevance of rejected contracts
object allocation, voting, strategy-proofness, popular matching
secure strategy-proofness, matching, allocation, mechanism, characterization, equilibrium.
the cumulative offer process, truncation, invariance, characterization, unilateral substitutes, irrelevance of rejected contracts.
waitlist, matching, mechanism, allocation, myopic stability, farsighted stability.
tuition transfer, mechanism, matching, stability, efficiency, strategy-proofness
