Julien Combe

CREST - Ecole polytechnique

Assistant Professor

Office 4082, CREST - Ecole polytechnique

5 Avenue Le Chatelier

Palaiseau, 91120

France

http://https://sites.google.com/site/combeju

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

5

DOWNLOADS

93

SSRN CITATIONS

0

CROSSREF CITATIONS

0

Scholarly Papers (5)

1.

Matching with Ownership

Number of pages: 18 Posted: 18 Nov 2017
Julien Combe
CREST - Ecole polytechnique
Downloads 35 (536,330)

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Three-sided matching, Ownership, Two-sided matching, Housing market, Core

2.

Teacher Assignment and Minimal Envy Mechanisms

Number of pages: 24 Posted: 03 Mar 2018 Last Revised: 04 Apr 2018
Julien Combe
CREST - Ecole polytechnique
Downloads 32 (552,150)

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Matching, Teacher assignment, Reassignment, Minimal envy mechanisms

Unpaired Kidney Exchange: Overcoming Double Coincidence of Wants without Money

University of Chicago, Becker Friedman Institute for Economics Working Paper No. 2020-126
Number of pages: 74 Posted: 10 Sep 2020
Stanford University, CREST - Ecole polytechnique, University of Toulouse 1 - Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), affiliation not provided to SSRN, University of Chicago - Department of Economics and Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques (PSE)
Downloads 15 (687,606)

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Kidney exchange, medium of exchange, dynamic matching

Unpaired Kidney Exchange: Overcoming Double Coincidence of Wants Without Money

NBER Working Paper No. w27765
Number of pages: 74 Posted: 11 Sep 2020 Last Revised: 14 May 2021
Stanford University, CREST - Ecole polytechnique, University of Toulouse 1 - Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), affiliation not provided to SSRN, University of Chicago - Department of Economics and Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques (PSE)
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4.

Reallocation with Priorities

Number of pages: 21 Posted: 04 Jun 2021 Last Revised: 07 Jun 2021
Julien Combe and Jan Christoph Schlegel
CREST - Ecole polytechnique and City, University of London
Downloads 10 (701,320)

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Matching, Housing Market, Reallocation, Stability, Priorities

5.

Dynamic assignment without money: Optimality of spot mechanisms

Number of pages: 34
Julien Combe, Vladyslav Nora and Olivier Tercieux
CREST - Ecole polytechnique, Nazarbayev University and Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques (PSE)
Downloads 1

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Market design, Dynamic assignment, Spot mechanisms