default author photo

Julien Combe

CREST - Ecole polytechnique

Assistant Professor

Office 4082, CREST - Ecole polytechnique

5 Avenue Le Chatelier

Palaiseau, 91120

France

http://https://sites.google.com/site/combeju

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

6

DOWNLOADS

723

TOTAL CITATIONS

9

Scholarly Papers (6)

1.

Market Design for Distributional Objectives in (Re)assignment: An Application to Improve the Distribution of Teachers in Schools

Number of pages: 109 Posted: 24 Feb 2025 Last Revised: 25 Mar 2025
CREST - Ecole polytechnique, North Carolina State University, Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques (PSE), Queen Mary University of London and Boston College - Department of Economics
Downloads 275 (287,269)
Citation 3

Abstract:

Loading...

2.

Teacher Assignment and Minimal Envy Mechanisms

Number of pages: 24 Posted: 03 Mar 2018 Last Revised: 04 Apr 2018
Julien Combe
CREST - Ecole polytechnique
Downloads 119 (600,462)

Abstract:

Loading...

Matching, Teacher assignment, Reassignment, Minimal envy mechanisms

3.

Dynamic Assignment Without Money: Optimality of Spot Mechanisms

Number of pages: 34 Posted: 02 Aug 2021 Last Revised: 10 Dec 2021
Julien Combe, Vladyslav Nora and Olivier Tercieux
CREST - Ecole polytechnique, Economics department, Nazarbayev University and Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques (PSE)
Downloads 95 (720,278)

Abstract:

Loading...

Market design, Dynamic assignment, Spot mechanisms

4.

Matching with Ownership

Number of pages: 18 Posted: 18 Nov 2017
Julien Combe
CREST - Ecole polytechnique
Downloads 89 (753,595)
Citation 1

Abstract:

Loading...

Three-sided matching, Ownership, Two-sided matching, Housing market, Core

Unpaired Kidney Exchange: Overcoming Double Coincidence of Wants without Money

University of Chicago, Becker Friedman Institute for Economics Working Paper No. 2020-126
Number of pages: 74 Posted: 10 Sep 2020
Stanford University, CREST - Ecole polytechnique, University of Toulouse 1 - Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), Université Paris II Panthéon-Assas, University of Chicago - Department of Economics and Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques (PSE)
Downloads 58 (1,017,159)

Abstract:

Loading...

Kidney exchange, medium of exchange, dynamic matching

Unpaired Kidney Exchange: Overcoming Double Coincidence of Wants without Money

NBER Working Paper No. w27765
Number of pages: 74 Posted: 11 Sep 2020 Last Revised: 14 May 2023
Stanford University, CREST - Ecole polytechnique, University of Toulouse 1 - Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), Université Paris II Panthéon-Assas, University of Chicago - Department of Economics and Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques (PSE)
Downloads 24 (1,445,011)
Citation 5

Abstract:

Loading...

6.

Reallocation with Priorities

Number of pages: 21 Posted: 04 Jun 2021 Last Revised: 07 Jun 2021
Julien Combe and Jan Christoph Schlegel
CREST - Ecole polytechnique and City University London
Downloads 63 (933,592)

Abstract:

Loading...

Matching, Housing Market, Reallocation, Stability, Priorities