An Auction Market for Journal Articles

CentER Discussion Paper No. 2007-79

TILEC Discussion Paper No. 2007-027

25 Pages Posted: 18 Feb 2005 Last revised: 1 Nov 2010

See all articles by Jens Prufer

Jens Prufer

Tilburg University; Tilburg University - Department of Economics; Tilburg University - Law and Economics Center (TILEC)

David Zetland

Leiden University - Leiden University College

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: May 22, 2009

Abstract

We recommend that an auction market replace the current system for submitting academic papers and show a strict Pareto-improvement in equilibrium. Besides the benefit of speed, this mechanism increases the average quality of articles and journals and rewards editors and referees for their effort. The "academic dollar" proceeds from papers sold at auction go to authors, editors and referees of cited articles. This nonpecuniary income indicates the academic impact of an article - facilitating decisions on tenure and promotion. This auction market does not require more work of editors.

Keywords: Academic Journals, Academic Productivity, Market Design

JEL Classification: A11, D02, D44

Suggested Citation

Prufer, Jens and Zetland, David, An Auction Market for Journal Articles (May 22, 2009). CentER Discussion Paper No. 2007-79, TILEC Discussion Paper No. 2007-027, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1005304 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1005304

Jens Prufer

Tilburg University ( email )

P.O. Box 90153
Tilburg, DC Noord-Brabant 5000 LE
Netherlands

Tilburg University - Department of Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 90153
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

Tilburg University - Law and Economics Center (TILEC) ( email )

Warandelaan 2
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

David Zetland (Contact Author)

Leiden University - Leiden University College ( email )

P.O. Box 13228
Den Haag, 2501EE
Netherlands

HOME PAGE: http://https://www.universiteitleiden.nl/en/staffmembers/david-zetland#tab-1

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