Abstract

https://ssrn.com/abstract=1146825
 
 

References (25)



 


 



Keeping Both Eyes Wide Open: The Life of a Competition Authority Among Sectoral Regulators


Pedro P. Barros


Universidade Nova de Lisboa

Steffen Hoernig


Nova School of Business and Economics

Tore Nilssen


University of Oslo - Department of Economics

June 2008

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP6861

Abstract:     
Competition authorities must pay attention to many industries simultaneously. Sectoral regulators concentrate on their own industry. Often both types of authority may intervene in specific industries and there is an overlap of jurisdictions. We show how a competition authority's resource allocation is affected by its relationships with sectoral regulators and their biases. If agencies collaborate (compete), the competition authority spends more effort on the industry with the more (less) consumer-biased sectoral regulator. The competition authority spends budget increases on the industry whose regulator reacts less to more effort. The socially optimal budget corrects for distortions due to regulatory bias, but only downwards.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 34

Keywords: Competition authority, Regulatory bias, Sectoral regulators

JEL Classification: H11, L40, L51


Date posted: June 17, 2008  

Suggested Citation

Barros, Pedro P. and Hoernig, Steffen and Nilssen, Tore, Keeping Both Eyes Wide Open: The Life of a Competition Authority Among Sectoral Regulators (June 2008). , Vol. , pp. -, 2008. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1146825

Contact Information

Pedro Luis Pita Barros (Contact Author)
Universidade Nova de Lisboa ( email )
Campus de Campolide
Lisboa, 1099-032
Portugal
+351 21 383 3624 (Phone)
+351 21 388 6073 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://ppbarros.fe.unl.pt
Steffen Hoernig
Nova School of Business and Economics ( email )
Universidade Nova de Lisboa
Campus de Campolide
Lisboa, 1099-032
Portugal
+351-213801600 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://docentes.fe.unl.pt/~shoernig/
Tore Nilssen
University of Oslo - Department of Economics ( email )
P.O. Box 1095 Blindern
N-0317 Oslo
Norway
Feedback to SSRN


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