The Market for Lawyers and the Quality of Legal Services

45 Pages Posted: 6 Aug 2010  

Elisabetta Iossa

University of Rome Tor Vergata; University of Bristol - Leverhulme Centre for Market and Public Organisation (CMPO)

Bruno Jullien

University of Toulouse 1 - Toulouse School of Economics (TSE); University of Toulouse 1 - Groupe de Recherche en Economie Mathématique et Quantitative (GREMAQ); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Date Written: July 2010

Abstract

Studying the strategic interaction between litigants, lawyers and judges, we analyze the value of the quality of legal representation and how public information over quality affects the outcome of the judicial process. Judges have reputational concerns and the quality of lawyers is reflected in knowledge of legal principles and in proof-taking ability. Deriving the demand for legal representation and the market equilibrium, we show that higher quality of legal representation is welfare increasing but better information over quality may be welfare reducing. We discuss the implications of our results on the desirability of quality ceritfication, such as the Queen's Counselor system.

Keywords: Carrer Concerns, Decision Bias, Market for Lawyers

JEL Classification: D82, K40

Suggested Citation

Iossa, Elisabetta and Jullien, Bruno, The Market for Lawyers and the Quality of Legal Services (July 2010). CEIS Working Paper No. 170. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1653919 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1653919

Elisabetta Iossa (Contact Author)

University of Rome Tor Vergata ( email )

Via Columbia n.2
Rome, 00133
Italy

University of Bristol - Leverhulme Centre for Market and Public Organisation (CMPO) ( email )

12 Priory Road
Bristol BS8 1TN
United Kingdom

Bruno Jullien

University of Toulouse 1 - Toulouse School of Economics (TSE) ( email )

Place Anatole-France
Toulouse Cedex, F-31042
France

University of Toulouse 1 - Groupe de Recherche en Economie Mathématique et Quantitative (GREMAQ) ( email )

Manufacture des Tabacs
21 Allees de Brienne
Toulouse, 31000
France
+33 5 6112 8561 (Phone)
+33 5 6122 8637 (Fax)

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Paper statistics

Downloads
57
Rank
297,319
Abstract Views
371