Role Selection and Team Performance

43 Pages Posted: 8 Aug 2011

See all articles by David J. Cooper

David J. Cooper

Florida State University - Department of Economics; University of East Anglia (UEA) - Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science (CBESS)

Matthias Sutter

Max Planck Society for the Advancement of the Sciences - Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods; University of Cologne - Department of Economics

Abstract

Team success relies on assigning team members to the right tasks. We use controlled experiments to study how roles are assigned within teams and how this affects team performance. Subjects play the takeover game in pairs consisting of a buyer and a seller. Understanding optimal play is very demanding for buyers and trivial for sellers. Teams perform better when roles are assigned endogenously or teammates are allowed to chat about their decisions, but the interaction effect between endogenous role assignment and chat unexpectedly worsens team performance. We argue that ego depletion provides a likely explanation for this surprising result.

Keywords: role selection in teams, team performance, takeover game, winner's curse, communication, experiment

JEL Classification: C91, C92

Suggested Citation

Cooper, David J. and Sutter, Matthias, Role Selection and Team Performance. IZA Discussion Paper No. 5892. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1906195

David J. Cooper

Florida State University - Department of Economics ( email )

Tallahassee, FL 30306-2180
United States

University of East Anglia (UEA) - Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science (CBESS) ( email )

United Kingdom

Matthias Sutter

Max Planck Society for the Advancement of the Sciences - Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods ( email )

Kurt-Schumacher-Str. 10
D-53113 Bonn, 53113
Germany

University of Cologne - Department of Economics

Cologne, 50923
Germany

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
49
Abstract Views
504
PlumX Metrics