PDF iconDownload This Paper
Open PDF in Browser
Add Paper to My Library
Permalink
Using these links will ensure access to this page indefinitely
Copy URL
Copy DOI

Merger in Contests

16 Pages Posted: 20 Feb 2001

See all articles by Kai A. Konrad

Kai A. Konrad

Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research); IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Steffen Huck

University College London - Department of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute); IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Wieland Müller

University of Vienna, Department of Economics & VCEE; Tilburg University, Department of Economics & CentER; Corvinus Institute for Advanced Studies (CIAS), Corvinus University of Budapest

Date Written: January 2000

Abstract

Competition in some markets is a contest. This paper studies the merger incentives in such markets. Merger can be profitable. The profitability depends on the post-merger contest structure, the discriminatory power of the contest and on the number of contestants.

Keywords: Contests, merger

JEL Classification: D44, L11, L13

Suggested Citation

Konrad, Kai A. and Huck, Steffen and Müller, Wieland, Merger in Contests (January 2000). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=260745 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.260745

Kai A. Konrad (Contact Author)

Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance ( email )

Marstallplatz 1
Munich, 80539
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.tax.mpg.de/en/pub/home.cfm

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

90-98 Goswell Road
London, EC1V 7RR
United Kingdom

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, 81679
Germany

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, 53072
Germany

Steffen Huck

University College London - Department of Economics ( email )

Gower Street
London WC1E 6BT, WC1E 6BT
United Kingdom
+44 207 679 5895 (Phone)
+44 207 916 2774 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.ucl.ac.uk/~uctpshu/

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Wieland Müller

University of Vienna, Department of Economics & VCEE ( email )

Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1
Vienna, A-1090
Austria

HOME PAGE: http://https://homepage.univie.ac.at/wieland.mueller/

Tilburg University, Department of Economics & CentER ( email )

P.O. Box 90153
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

HOME PAGE: http://www.tilburguniversity.edu/webwijs/show/w.mueller-3.htm

Corvinus Institute for Advanced Studies (CIAS), Corvinus University of Budapest ( email )

Közraktár utca 4-6
Budapest, 1093
Hungary

PDF iconDownload This Paper
Open PDF in Browser

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Place Job Opening

Paper statistics

Downloads
356
Abstract Views
3,049
Rank
183,757
PlumX Metrics

Related eJournals

Recommended Papers