Bidding Behavior in Asymmetric Auctions: An Experimental Study

European Economic Review, 49: 187-192 (2005)

30 Pages Posted: 20 Aug 2001 Last revised: 31 Oct 2017

See all articles by Werner Guth

Werner Guth

Max Planck Institute of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Radosveta Ivanova-Stenzel

Technische Universität Berlin (TU Berlin)

Elmar Wolfstetter

Humboldt University of Berlin - Faculty of Economics; Korea University - College of Economics and Commerce; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Abstract

We review an asymmetric auction experiment. Based on Plum (1992) private valuations of the two bidders are independently drawn from distinct but commonly known distributions, one of which stochastically dominating the other. We test the qualitative properties of that model of asymmetric auctions, in particular whether the weak bidder behaves more aggressively than the strong and then test bidders' preference for first- vs. second-price auctions.

Keywords: Sealed Bid Auctions, Asymmetric Bidders, Private-Independent Values, Experiments

JEL Classification: D44, C91

Suggested Citation

Güth, Werner and Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta and Wolfstetter, Elmar G., Bidding Behavior in Asymmetric Auctions: An Experimental Study. European Economic Review, 49: 187-192 (2005). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=280599 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.280599

Werner Güth

Max Planck Institute of Economics ( email )

Kahlaische Strasse 10
D-07745 Jena, 07745
Germany

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Radosveta Ivanova-Stenzel (Contact Author)

Technische Universität Berlin (TU Berlin) ( email )

Straße des 17. Juni 135
Berlin, 10623
Germany

Elmar G. Wolfstetter

Humboldt University of Berlin - Faculty of Economics ( email )

Institut für Wirtschaftstheorie I
Spandauer Strasse 1
Berlin
Germany
+49 30 2093 5652/3 (Phone)
+49 30 2093 5619 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www2.hu-berlin.de/wt1wo/staff/wolfstetter/index.html

Korea University - College of Economics and Commerce ( email )

Anam-dong, Sungbuk-Ku
Seoul, 136-701
Korea

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.CESifo.de

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