SFB 373 Humboldt University Discussion Paper No. 2001/15
30 Pages Posted: 20 Aug 2001
We review an asymmetric auction experiment. Based on Plum (1992) private valuations of the two bidders are independently drawn from distinct but commonly known distributions, one of which stochastically dominating the other. We test the qualitative properties of that model of asymmetric auctions, in particular whether the weak bidder behaves more aggressively than the strong and then test bidders' preference for first- vs. second-price auctions.
Keywords: Sealed Bid Auctions, Asymmetric Bidders, Private-Independent Values, Experiments
JEL Classification: D44, C91
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Guth, Werner and Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta and Wolfstetter, Elmar, Bidding Behavior in Asymmetric Auctions: An Experimental Study. SFB 373 Humboldt University Discussion Paper No. 2001/15. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=280599 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.280599