Bidding Behavior in Asymmetric Auctions: An Experimental Study

European Economic Review, 49: 187-192 (2005)

30 Pages Posted: 20 Aug 2001 Last revised: 31 Oct 2017

See all articles by Werner Güth

Werner Güth

Max Planck Society for the Advancement of the Sciences - Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods; LUISS Guido Carli University

Radosveta Ivanova-Stenzel

Technische Universität Berlin (TU Berlin)

Elmar Wolfstetter

Humboldt University of Berlin - Faculty of Economics; Korea University - College of Economics and Commerce; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Abstract

We review an asymmetric auction experiment. Based on Plum (1992) private valuations of the two bidders are independently drawn from distinct but commonly known distributions, one of which stochastically dominating the other. We test the qualitative properties of that model of asymmetric auctions, in particular whether the weak bidder behaves more aggressively than the strong and then test bidders' preference for first- vs. second-price auctions.

Keywords: Sealed Bid Auctions, Asymmetric Bidders, Private-Independent Values, Experiments

JEL Classification: D44, C91

Suggested Citation

Güth, Werner and Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta and Wolfstetter, Elmar G., Bidding Behavior in Asymmetric Auctions: An Experimental Study. European Economic Review, 49: 187-192 (2005). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=280599 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.280599

Werner Güth

Max Planck Society for the Advancement of the Sciences - Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Kurt-Schumacher-Str. 10
D-53113 Bonn, 53113
Germany

LUISS Guido Carli University ( email )

Via O. Tommasini 1
Rome, Roma 00100
Italy

Radosveta Ivanova-Stenzel (Contact Author)

Technische Universität Berlin (TU Berlin) ( email )

Straße des 17. Juni 135
Berlin, 10623
Germany

Elmar G. Wolfstetter

Humboldt University of Berlin - Faculty of Economics ( email )

Institut für Wirtschaftstheorie I
Spandauer Strasse 1
Berlin
Germany
+49 30 2093 5652/3 (Phone)
+49 30 2093 5619 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www2.hu-berlin.de/wt1wo/staff/wolfstetter/index.html

Korea University - College of Economics and Commerce ( email )

Anam-dong, Sungbuk-Ku
Seoul, 136-701
Korea

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.CESifo.de

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