Bidding Behavior in Asymmetric Auctions: An Experimental Study
European Economic Review, 49: 187-192 (2005)
30 Pages Posted: 20 Aug 2001 Last revised: 31 Oct 2017
We review an asymmetric auction experiment. Based on Plum (1992) private valuations of the two bidders are independently drawn from distinct but commonly known distributions, one of which stochastically dominating the other. We test the qualitative properties of that model of asymmetric auctions, in particular whether the weak bidder behaves more aggressively than the strong and then test bidders' preference for first- vs. second-price auctions.
Keywords: Sealed Bid Auctions, Asymmetric Bidders, Private-Independent Values, Experiments
JEL Classification: D44, C91
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation