Digital Piracy and Bundling of Information Goods

41 Pages Posted: 1 Apr 2019 Last revised: 16 Dec 2020

See all articles by Chenguang (Allen) Wu

Chenguang (Allen) Wu

Hong Kong University of Science and Technology

Chen Jin

National University of Singapore

Atanu Lahiri

University of Texas Dallas

Date Written: December 15, 2020

Abstract

Bundling of information goods is quite common. As prior research shows, bundling is particularly profitable in their case because their marginal production cost is zero. However, information goods are known to be prone to piracy, and it is still not clear what impact, if any, piracy can have on the appeal of bundling. To address this, we reexamine bundling in the backdrop of piracy. We find that piracy diminishes the appeal of bundling to the extent that selling separately may become optimal despite zero marginal cost. Interestingly, even when product valuations are negatively correlated and bundling is anticipated to be even more effective, separate selling can be surprisingly optimal in the presence of piracy. This impact of piracy carries over to situations where a fraction of the users are ethical and do not consider piracy to be an option. Furthermore, piracy elevates the relative appeal of separate selling so much so that even mixed bundling becomes ineffective in certain situations. Collectively, our results point to the insight that the purported benefits of bundling may not fully materialize in the presence of piracy.

Keywords: Information goods, piracy, pricing, bundling

Suggested Citation

Wu, Chenguang (Allen) and Jin, Chen and Lahiri, Atanu, Digital Piracy and Bundling of Information Goods (December 15, 2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3336488 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3336488

Chenguang (Allen) Wu

Hong Kong University of Science and Technology ( email )

Room 5559C, Academic Building
HongKong University of Science and Technology
Hong Kong
Hong Kong

Chen Jin

National University of Singapore ( email )

13 Computing Drive
Singapore, 117417
Singapore

Atanu Lahiri (Contact Author)

University of Texas Dallas ( email )

University of Texas at Dallas
Richardson, TX 75080
United States

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