Bank Mergers, the Market for Bank CEOS, and Managerial Incentives
39 Pages Posted: 17 Jun 2003
After a large bank merger the compensation of the surviving bank's CEO often increases materially. Theories of executive compensation based on managerial productivity and optimal incentives suggest that changes in CEO compensation are related to the potential gains from merger. Alternatively, compensation gains might result from an increase in bank size regardless of whether the merger creates value. We examine mergers among billion-dollar banks in the 1990s and find results consistent with managerial productivity. Specifically, we show empirically that changes in CEO compensation after mergers are positively related to anticipated gains from merger measured at the announcement date. Other changes in the structure of compensation are also consistent with hypotheses based on managerial productivity and incentive restructuring.
Keywords: Bank mergers, CEO compensation
JEL Classification: G21, G34
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation