How Workers Fare When Employers Innovate

38 Pages Posted: 14 Mar 2003 Last revised: 24 Feb 2021

See all articles by Sandra E. Black

Sandra E. Black

University of Texas at Austin - Center for Law, Business, and Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); IZA Institute of Labor Economics; Norwegian School of Economics (NHH) - Department of Economics

Lisa M. Lynch

Tufts University - The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Anya Krivelyova

Boston College - Department of Economics

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: March 2003

Abstract

Complementing existing work on firm organizational structure and productivity, this paper examines the impact of organizational change on workers. We find evidence that employers do appear to compensate at least some of their workers for engaging in high performance workplace practices. We also find a significant association between high performance workplace practices and increased wage inequality. Finally, we examine the relationship between organizational structure and employment changes and find that some practices, such as self-managed teams, are associated with greater employment reductions, while other practices, such as the percentage of workers involved in job rotation, are associated with lower employment reductions.

Suggested Citation

Black, Sandra E. and Lynch, Lisa M. and Krivelyova, Anya, How Workers Fare When Employers Innovate (March 2003). NBER Working Paper No. w9569, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=387576

Sandra E. Black (Contact Author)

University of Texas at Austin - Center for Law, Business, and Economics ( email )

Austin, TX
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

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IZA Institute of Labor Economics

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Norwegian School of Economics (NHH) - Department of Economics

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Lisa M. Lynch

Tufts University - The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy ( email )

Cabot 602
Medford, MA 02155
United States
617-627-5451 (Phone)
617-627-3712 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://fletcher.tufts.edu/staff/llynch/Default.htm

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Anya Krivelyova

Boston College - Department of Economics ( email )

140 Commonwealth Avenue
Chestnut Hill, MA 02467
United States
404-869-4715 (Phone)

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