When, and Why, Do Teams Benefit from Self-Selection?

Experimental Economics (forthcoming)

37 Pages Posted: 16 Mar 2023

See all articles by Mira Fischer

Mira Fischer

University of Cologne - Department of Business Administration and Human Resource Management

Rainer Michael Rilke

WHU - Otto Beisheim School of Management

B. Burcin Yurtoglu

WHU - Otto Beisheim School of Management

Date Written: March 2, 2023

Abstract

We investigate the effect of team formation and task characteristics on performance in highstakes team tasks. In two field experiments, randomly assigned teams performed significantly better than self-selected teams in a task that allowed for an unequal work distribution. The effect was reversed if the task required the two team members to contribute more equally. Investigating mechanisms, we observe that teams become more similar in ability and report to cooperate better when team members can choose each other. We show how different levels of skill complementarity across tasks may explain our results: If team performance largely depends on the abilities of one team member, random team assignment may be preferred because it leads to a more equal distribution of skills across teams. However, if both team members’ abilities play a significant role in team production, the advantage of random assignment is reduced, and the value of team cooperation increases.

Note: This paper is a revised version of : Fischer, Mira and Rilke, Rainer Michael and Yurtoglu, B. Burcin, Two Field Experiments on Self-Selection, Collaboration Intensity, and Team Performance. IZA Discussion Paper No. 13201, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3590900

Keywords: Team Performance, Self-selection, Field Experiment

JEL Classification: I21, M54, C93

Suggested Citation

Fischer, Mira and Rilke, Rainer Michael and Yurtoglu, B. Burcin, When, and Why, Do Teams Benefit from Self-Selection? (March 2, 2023). Experimental Economics (forthcoming), Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4386759

Mira Fischer

University of Cologne - Department of Business Administration and Human Resource Management ( email )

Koln, 50923
Germany

Rainer Michael Rilke

WHU - Otto Beisheim School of Management ( email )

Burgplatz 2
Vallendar, 56179
Germany

B. Burcin Yurtoglu (Contact Author)

WHU - Otto Beisheim School of Management ( email )

Chair of Corporate Finance
Burgplatz 2
Vallendar, 56179
Germany
+49 261 6509-721 (Phone)
+49 261 6509-729 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.whu.edu/forschung/fakultaet/finance-group/corporate-finance/

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