When, and Why, Do Teams Benefit from Self-Selection?
Experimental Economics (forthcoming)
37 Pages Posted: 16 Mar 2023
Date Written: March 2, 2023
Abstract
We investigate the effect of team formation and task characteristics on performance in highstakes team tasks. In two field experiments, randomly assigned teams performed significantly better than self-selected teams in a task that allowed for an unequal work distribution. The effect was reversed if the task required the two team members to contribute more equally. Investigating mechanisms, we observe that teams become more similar in ability and report to cooperate better when team members can choose each other. We show how different levels of skill complementarity across tasks may explain our results: If team performance largely depends on the abilities of one team member, random team assignment may be preferred because it leads to a more equal distribution of skills across teams. However, if both team members’ abilities play a significant role in team production, the advantage of random assignment is reduced, and the value of team cooperation increases.
Note: This paper is a revised version of : Fischer, Mira and Rilke, Rainer Michael and Yurtoglu, B. Burcin, Two Field Experiments on Self-Selection, Collaboration Intensity, and Team Performance. IZA Discussion Paper No. 13201, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3590900
Keywords: Team Performance, Self-selection, Field Experiment
JEL Classification: I21, M54, C93
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation