Public Sector Bargaining and the Local Budgetary Process

47 Pages Posted: 28 Jun 2004 Last revised: 21 Dec 2022

See all articles by Joseph Gyourko

Joseph Gyourko

University of Pennsylvania - Real Estate Department; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Joseph S. Tracy

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas

Date Written: March 1989

Abstract

This paper investigates how the fiscal environment and the budgetary process affect wage and employment determination in the local public sector. The structure of the local tax system is found to be influential with significantly higher wages occurring in cities with access to local sales and/or income taxes. State-imposed property tax limits are found to be associated with lower wages (but not overall payrolls per capita). We find evidence that skill enhancement may be an important policy tool. Local governments appear to successfully use it to mitigate the wage premia associated with strong state collective bargaining legislation. We also find that controlling for the human capital of teachers substantially reduces the well-known positive correlation between teacher wages and community income.

Suggested Citation

Gyourko, Joseph E. and Tracy, Joseph, Public Sector Bargaining and the Local Budgetary Process (March 1989). NBER Working Paper No. w2915, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=459423

Joseph E. Gyourko

University of Pennsylvania - Real Estate Department ( email )

Philadelphia, PA 19104-6330
United States
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National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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Joseph Tracy (Contact Author)

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas ( email )

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Dallas, TX 75265-5906
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