Eva I. Hoppe

University of Cologne - Department of Economics

Cologne, 50923

Germany

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

13

DOWNLOADS
Rank 17,080

SSRN RANKINGS

Top 17,080

in Total Papers Downloads

2,898

SSRN CITATIONS
Rank 7,232

SSRN RANKINGS

Top 7,232

in Total Papers Citations

17

CROSSREF CITATIONS

126

Scholarly Papers (13)

Public-Private Partnerships Versus Traditional Procurement: Innovation Incentives and Information Gathering

Number of pages: 31 Posted: 28 Feb 2010 Last Revised: 15 Oct 2012
Eva I. Hoppe and Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne - Department of Economics and University of Cologne
Downloads 713 (35,484)
Citation 6

Abstract:

Loading...

Public-Private Partnerships, Integration Versus Separation, Information Gathering, Incomplete Contracts

Public-Private Partnerships versus Traditional Procurement: Innovation Incentives and Information Gathering

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP7681
Number of pages: 32 Posted: 10 Feb 2010
Eva I. Hoppe and Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne - Department of Economics and University of Cologne
Downloads 2 (689,105)
Citation 1
  • Add to Cart

Abstract:

Loading...

Incomplete contracts, Information gathering, Integration versus separation, Public-private partnerships

Can Contracts Solve the Hold-Up Problem? Experimental Evidence

Number of pages: 43 Posted: 06 Mar 2009 Last Revised: 15 Dec 2010
Eva I. Hoppe and Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne - Department of Economics and University of Cologne
Downloads 440 (66,326)
Citation 3

Abstract:

Loading...

Hold-up problem, option contracts, renegotiation, experiment

Can Contracts Solve the Hold-Up Problem? Experimental Evidence

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP7205
Number of pages: 31 Posted: 07 Apr 2009
Eva I. Hoppe and Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne - Department of Economics and University of Cologne
Downloads 5 (661,751)
Citation 1
  • Add to Cart

Abstract:

Loading...

Experiment, Hold-up problem, Option contracts, Renegotiation

Public versus Private Ownership: Quantity Contracts and the Allocation of Investment Tasks

Number of pages: 29 Posted: 28 Feb 2009 Last Revised: 17 Dec 2009
Eva I. Hoppe and Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne - Department of Economics and University of Cologne
Downloads 389 (76,918)

Abstract:

Loading...

Incomplete contracts, Contractible control, Privatization

Public versus Private Ownership: Quantity Contracts and the Allocation of Investment Tasks

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP7056
Number of pages: 32 Posted: 18 Dec 2008
Eva I. Hoppe and Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne - Department of Economics and University of Cologne
Downloads 2 (689,105)
  • Add to Cart

Abstract:

Loading...

Contractible control, Incomplete contracts, Privatization

4.

Behavioral Biases and Cognitive Reflection

Number of pages: 10 Posted: 16 Oct 2009
Eva I. Hoppe and David J. Kusterer
University of Cologne - Department of Economics and University of Cologne - Department of Economics
Downloads 348 (88,296)
Citation 2

Abstract:

Loading...

cognitive reflection test, base rate fallacy, conservatism, overconfidence, endowment

Gathering Information Before Signing a Contract: Experimental Evidence

Number of pages: 25 Posted: 01 Apr 2009 Last Revised: 17 Jul 2009
Eva I. Hoppe and Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne - Department of Economics and University of Cologne
Downloads 327 (94,043)
Citation 1

Abstract:

Loading...

Agency theory, adverse selection, information gathering, experiment

Gathering Information Before Signing a Contract: Experimental Evidence

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP7252
Number of pages: 27 Posted: 15 Apr 2009
Eva I. Hoppe and Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne - Department of Economics and University of Cologne
Downloads 4 (669,522)
  • Add to Cart

Abstract:

Loading...

adverse selection, agency theory, experiment, information gathering

6.

Conflicting Tasks and Moral Hazard: Theory and Experimental Evidence

Number of pages: 46 Posted: 25 Oct 2009
Eva I. Hoppe and David J. Kusterer
University of Cologne - Department of Economics and University of Cologne - Department of Economics
Downloads 220 (143,054)
Citation 2

Abstract:

Loading...

moral hazard, conflicting tasks, experiment

Contracting under Incomplete Information and Social Preferences: An Experimental Study

Number of pages: 66 Posted: 22 Dec 2012
Eva I. Hoppe and Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne - Department of Economics and University of Cologne
Downloads 187 (166,385)

Abstract:

Loading...

agency theory, adverse selection, information gathering, ultimatum game, social preferences, experiment

Contracting Under Incomplete Information and Social Preferences: An Experimental Study

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP9287
Number of pages: 68 Posted: 01 Feb 2013
Eva I. Hoppe and Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne - Department of Economics and University of Cologne
Downloads 0
Citation 2
  • Add to Cart

Abstract:

Loading...

Adverse selection, Agency theory, Experiment, Information gathering, Social preferences, Ultimatum game

The Costs and Benefits of Additional Information in Agency Models with Endogenous Information Structures

Number of pages: 13 Posted: 15 Jun 2009
Eva I. Hoppe and Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne - Department of Economics and University of Cologne
Downloads 185 (167,987)

Abstract:

Loading...

Hidden information, adverse selection, information gathering

The Costs and Benefits of Additional Information in Agency Models with Endogenous Information Structures

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP7331
Number of pages: 15 Posted: 15 Jul 2009
Eva I. Hoppe and Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne - Department of Economics and University of Cologne
Downloads 2 (689,105)
  • Add to Cart

Abstract:

Loading...

adverse selection, Hidden information, information gathering

9.

Observability of Information Acquisition in Agency Models

Number of pages: 16 Posted: 09 Jan 2013 Last Revised: 07 Mar 2013
Eva I. Hoppe
University of Cologne - Department of Economics
Downloads 55 (383,122)

Abstract:

Loading...

hidden information, adverse selection, information gathering

10.

Hidden Action and Outcome Contractibility: An Experimental Test of Moral Hazard Theory

Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 109, 2018, pp. 544-564
Number of pages: 67 Posted: 21 Aug 2019
Eva I. Hoppe and Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne - Department of Economics and University of Cologne
Downloads 16 (561,500)

Abstract:

Loading...

Moral hazard, Hidden action, Contract theory, Incentive theory, Laboratory experiments

11.

Public-Private Partnerships Versus Traditional Procurement: An Experimental Investigation

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP8167
Number of pages: 48 Posted: 18 Jan 2011
University of Cologne - Department of Economics, University of Cologne - Department of Economics and University of Cologne
Downloads 2 (657,866)
  • Add to Cart

Abstract:

Loading...

experiment, incomplete contracts, procurement, public-private partnerships

12.

Do Sellers Offer Menus of Contracts to Separate Buyer Types? An Experimental Test of Adverse Selection Theory

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP9510
Number of pages: 53 Posted: 21 Jun 2013
Eva I. Hoppe and Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne - Department of Economics and University of Cologne
Downloads 1 (669,877)
Citation 1
  • Add to Cart

Abstract:

Loading...

Incentive theory, Laboratory experiment, Mechanism design, Private information

13.

How (Not) to Foster Innovations in Public Infrastructure Projects

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP13406
Number of pages: 35 Posted: 07 Jan 2019
Eva I. Hoppe and Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne - Department of Economics and University of Cologne
Downloads 0 (686,947)
  • Add to Cart

Abstract:

Loading...

innovations, moral hazard, Procurement, public-private partnerships, Renegotiation