Cologne, 50923
Germany
University of Cologne - Department of Economics
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Public-Private Partnerships, Integration Versus Separation, Information Gathering, Incomplete Contracts
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Incomplete contracts, Information gathering, Integration versus separation, Public-private partnerships
Hold-up problem, option contracts, renegotiation, experiment
Experiment, Hold-up problem, Option contracts, Renegotiation
cognitive reflection test, base rate fallacy, conservatism, overconfidence, endowment
Incomplete contracts, Contractible control, Privatization
Contractible control, Incomplete contracts, Privatization
Agency theory, adverse selection, information gathering, experiment
adverse selection, agency theory, experiment, information gathering
moral hazard, conflicting tasks, experiment
agency theory, adverse selection, information gathering, ultimatum game, social preferences, experiment
Adverse selection, Agency theory, Experiment, Information gathering, Social preferences, Ultimatum game
Hidden information, adverse selection, information gathering
adverse selection, Hidden information, information gathering
Moral hazard, Hidden action, Contract theory, Incentive theory, Laboratory experiments
hidden information, adverse selection, information gathering
contract theory, procurement, public-private partnerships, moral hazard, renegotiation
innovations, moral hazard, Procurement, public-private partnerships, Renegotiation
experiment, incomplete contracts, procurement, public-private partnerships
Incentive theory, Laboratory experiment, Mechanism design, Private information
