United Kingdom
Department of Economics, University of Bristol
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Market design, school choice, unified enrollment
Ex-Ante Efficiency, Probabilistic Assignment, Fairness, Probabilistic Serial Mechanism
School choice, choice rules, diversity
Marriage problems, probabilistic assignment, efficiency, stability
choice rules, lexicographic choice, deferred acceptance, diversity
School choice, a
affirmative action, bounded reserve representation, lexicographic choice.
market design, multistage assignment, school choice, deferred acceptance algorithm
Market Design, School Choice, Consistency, Weak Consistency, EADA
Choice rules, acceptance, substitutability, path independence, prime atom
school choice, stability, immediate acceptance rule
No-envy, Nash-implementation, Divide-and-Transpose
school choice, deferred acceptance, stability comparisons, cardinal minimal instability
affirmative action, consistency, favoring-higher-ranks, immediate acceptance mechanism, non-bossiness, non-wastefulness, rank-respecting unavailable-type-invariance, resource-monotonicity
Ordinal assignment problem, sd-efficiency, dl-efficiency, ul-efficiency, ex post efficiency
Market design, school choice, unified enrollment.
School choice, stability comparisons, minimal instability, deferred acceptance
UK university admissions, widening access, smart targets.