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University of Toronto - Department of Economics
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market segmentation, opaque travel agency, separation equilibrium, price discrimination
optimal auctions, information acquisition, informational efficiency, rotation order, first-order approach
Advertising, Platforms, Privacy, Pricing
Contests, status, normalized spacing, organization design
Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism, Information acquisition, Strategic substitutes, Informational efficiency
Committee, Search, Specialization, Interdependent Values, Voting
Level-k Models, Beauty Contests, Coordination Games
matching, specialization, task assignment, span of control
social welfare, social skill, cognitive skill, matching, sorting, education, labor, marriage, linear programming
patent design, sequential innovation, patent length, patent breadth
Contests, All-pay auctions, Punishments, Order Statistics
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All-pay auctions, Contests, Order Statistics, Punishments
search, intermediation, learning, externalities, inventory management
Bayesian implementation, dominant strategy implementation, mechanism design
Sequential Voting, Private Information, Interdependent Values, Condorcet Winner
Coase conjecture, auctions with limited commitment, sequential auctions
Sequential Voting, Interdependent values, Incomplete Information
Sequential Screening, Stochastic Contract, Mechanism Design
Financial intermediation, risk sharing, financial contagion
