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University of Toronto - Department of Economics
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market segmentation, opaque travel agency, separation equilibrium, price discrimination
optimal auctions, information acquisition, informational efficiency, rotation order, first-order approach
Contests, status, normalized spacing, organization design
Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism, Information acquisition, Strategic substitutes, Informational efficiency
Committee, Search, Specialization, Interdependent Values, Voting
patent design, sequential innovation, patent length, patent breadth
Contests, All-pay auctions, Punishments, Order Statistics
This is a CEPR Discussion Paper. CEPR charges a fee of $8.00 for this paper.
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All-pay auctions, Contests, Order Statistics, Punishments
This is a Wiley-Blackwell Publishing paper. Wiley-Blackwell Publishing charges $42.00 .
File name: j-7295.pdf Size: 505K
Level-k Models, Beauty Contests, Coordination Games
matching, specialization, task assignment, span of control
social skill, cognitive skill, matching, sorting, education, labor, marriage, social welfare, linear programming
search, intermediation, learning, externalities, inventory management
File name: jems.pdf Size: 449K
File name: CAJE.pdf Size: 0K
Financial intermediation, risk sharing, financial contagion
Bayesian implementation, dominant strategy implementation, mechanism design
