Loan Product Steering in Mortgage Market

46 Pages Posted: 22 Jan 2013 Last revised: 17 Dec 2015

See all articles by Sumit Agarwal

Sumit Agarwal

National University of Singapore

Douglas D. Evanoff

Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago

Date Written: January 21, 2013

Abstract

Accusations of unscrupulous lender behavior — e.g., predatory lending — abounded during the housing boom of the 2000s. Such behavior is said to have generated significant social costs as borrowers were misled into accepting loans with inferior characteristics relative to the mortgage products that they should have qualified for. However, there is little hard evidence of such behavior and few estimates of the true effect of such behavior. Much of the research to date is based on anecdotal evidence or analyzes differential loan terms for broad groups of borrowers that are thought to have been targeted for such lending behavior. We employ a more direct methodology and test whether a particular form of this behavior existed during the housing boom: credit steering toward predatory-like loan terms. With this steering, the broker or real estate professional encourages the home buyer to access credit from a particular lender that provides the credit, but at unattractive terms. We find evidence of such behavior. That is, we find evidence consistent with lenders steering higher-quality borrowers to affiliates that provide subprime-like loans. These borrowers were charged 40-60 bps higher APR, and were 2% points less likely to default compared to similar borrowers who were not steered to such loans — consistent with the steered borrowers receiving inferior loans given their qualifications. Delving deeper, we find that the loans with steered borrowers were more likely to be privately securitized and steering was not concentrated solely among the large banks. Our results are, to our knowledge, the first explicit evidence of systematic mortgage lending abuse during the run-up in the housing markets.

Keywords: Mortgages, mortgage steering, subprime crisis, predatory lending, household finance

JEL Classification: D12, D18, G18, G21, K2

Suggested Citation

Agarwal, Sumit and Evanoff, Douglas D., Loan Product Steering in Mortgage Market (January 21, 2013). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2204400 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2204400

Sumit Agarwal (Contact Author)

National University of Singapore ( email )

15 Kent Ridge Drive
Singapore, 117592
Singapore
8118 9025 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.ushakrisna.com

Douglas D. Evanoff

Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago ( email )

230 South LaSalle Street
Chicago, IL 60604
United States
312-322-5814 (Phone)

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