Social Ties in a Public Good Experiment

24 Pages Posted: 4 Apr 2001

See all articles by F. A. A. M. Van Winden

F. A. A. M. Van Winden

University of Amsterdam - Amsterdam School of Economics (ASE); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute); Tinbergen Institute

Frans van Dijk

University of Amsterdam - Amsterdam School of Economics (ASE)

Joep Sonnemans

University of Amsterdam - Amsterdam School of Economics (ASE)

Date Written: March 2000

Abstract

The formation of social ties is examined in an experimental study of voluntary public good provision. The experimental design consists of three parts. In the first part the value orientation (attitude to a generalized other) is measured. In the second part couples play a multi-period public good game. In the third part the attitudes of subjects to their partners in the public good game is measured. The concept of social tie is operationalized as the difference between the measurements in the first and third parts. Evidence for the occurrence of social ties is found. These ties depend on the success of the interaction in the public good game.

JEL Classification: C91, H41, A13

Suggested Citation

Van Winden, F. A. A. M. and van Dijk, Frans and Sonnemans, Joep, Social Ties in a Public Good Experiment (March 2000). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=263941 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.263941

F. A. A. M. Van Winden (Contact Author)

University of Amsterdam - Amsterdam School of Economics (ASE) ( email )

Roetersstraat 11
Amsterdam, North Holland 1018 WB
Netherlands

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Tinbergen Institute ( email )

Gustav Mahlerplein 117
Amsterdam, 1082 MS
Netherlands

Frans Van Dijk

University of Amsterdam - Amsterdam School of Economics (ASE) ( email )

Roetersstraat 11
Amsterdam, North Holland 1018 WB
Netherlands

Joep Sonnemans

University of Amsterdam - Amsterdam School of Economics (ASE) ( email )

Roetersstraat 11
1018 WB Amsterdam
Netherlands
+31 20 525 4249 (Phone)
+31 20 525 5283 (Fax)

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