Fairness in the Labour Market? A Survey of Experimental Results

Zurich IEER Working Paper No. 114

37 Pages Posted: 13 Nov 2002

See all articles by Simon Gächter

Simon Gächter

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute); IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Ernst Fehr

University of Zurich - Department of Economics

Abstract

In this chapter we provide a selective survey of experiments to investigate the potential of social motivations in explaining labour market phenomena. We argue that laboratory experiments are a useful instrument to explore issues in labour market theory and personnel economics. Our starting point is the observation that employment relations are frequently governed by incomplete contracts. We show that the norm of reciprocity that leads to gift exchanges is an effective contract enforcement device under conditions of contractual incompleteness. We then present evidence that gift exchange can explain various labour market phenomena that are puzzles from the viewpoint of standard economic theory. Further issues in the related field of personnel economics that have by now been subjected to an experimental scrutiny concern characteristics of the employment relation and the issues of motivation and incentives systems. We conclude by pointing out the complementary nature of experiments to more conventional methods of data gathering.

Suggested Citation

Gächter, Simon and Fehr, Ernst, Fairness in the Labour Market? A Survey of Experimental Results. Zurich IEER Working Paper No. 114, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=310619 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.310619

Simon Gächter

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Ernst Fehr (Contact Author)

University of Zurich - Department of Economics ( email )

Blümlisalpstrasse 10
Zuerich, 8006
Switzerland
+41 1 634 3709 (Phone)
+41 1 634 4907 (Fax)

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