Bonuses and Employment in Japan

39 Pages Posted: 6 Apr 2004 Last revised: 21 Aug 2022

See all articles by Richard B. Freeman

Richard B. Freeman

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); University of Edinburgh - School of Social and Political Studies; Harvard University; London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Centre for Economic Performance (CEP)

Martin Weitzman

Harvard University - Department of Economics

Date Written: April 1986

Abstract

Japan has a relatively unique system of labor compensation. Most Japanese workers are paid large bonuses twice a year. This paper examines the cyclical movement of bonuses compared with wages and the relation of bonuses to employment in the context of the Weitzman "share economy." The paper makes three basic points:(1) The Japanese bonus is much more pro-cyclical than Japanese base wages,but not as cyclically variable as profits. Bonuses can be interpreted as containing a quantitatively significant revenue or profit-sharing component.(2) Bonuses have quite different employment consequences than do base wages. Even after controlling for other economic factors, bonuses are positively related to employment, whereas base wages are negatively related to employment.(3) The bonus system of paying workers, while far from explaining the whole macroeconomic story in Japan, seems to play a role in helping to stabilize Japanese unemployment at comparatively low levels.

Suggested Citation

Freeman, Richard B. and Weitzman, Martin L., Bonuses and Employment in Japan (April 1986). NBER Working Paper No. w1878, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=341831

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